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This thesis explores the evolution of modern Algerian politics and the transition of
the Algerian government from a colonized nation to a free state. In the second half of the
20th century Algeria was plagued with war and violence from both internal and external
enemies. The Algerian War for Independence and the Algerian Civil War are frequently
viewed as two separate conflicts with little or no ties yet after researching the two, one
can draw a large number of parallels leading to the conclusion that the actions of the
French in the War for Independence were strikingly similar to those of the Algerian
administration in the 1990s. In addition, it can be claimed that the actions of the FLN in
the 1950s greatly influenced the FIS policy of the 1990s. Finally, it could also be
hypothesized that had the French pulled out of Algeria after the first year of the “Phony
War” in 1955, the course of Algerian politics would have been altered significantly
towards a more peaceful outcome. It is not solely the actors in the conflicts that remained
similar, but tactics and events as well as political actions and propaganda transcended the
thirty years between the conflicts. When finally given the chance to be a free nation, the
FLN and Algerian administration knew of no other way to govern than that of its
European predecessor while the FIS knew of no other way to express its discontent than
through a violent revolution like that of the FLN. The victims of the War for
Independence now became the victimizers, with a new organization garnering sympathy
for their cause. After nearly fifty years of political liberation, the Algerians have created a
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cyclical pattern where violence and political success have become mutually exclusive and
change must come at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives
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In the second half of the 20th century Algeria was plagued with war and violence from
both internal and external enemies. The Algerian War for Independence and the Algerian
Civil War are frequently viewed as two separate conflicts with little or no ties yet after
researching the two, one can draw a number of parallels leading to the conclusion that the
actions of the insurgency organizations and the governments are strikingly similar. In less
than fifty years the FLN evolved from victims of one war to the victimizers of another. In
researching the two conflicts in-depth, one can also create a hypothetical theory that had
the French pulled out of Algeria after the first year of fighting in 1955, the course of
Algerian politics would have been altered, resulting in a more peaceful outcome. It is
through close analysis of the colonial history of Algeria, the subsequent War for
Independence, and the Algerian Civil War that these two arguments can be fully
supported and understood.
The first section of the following work focuses on the details of the colonization
of Algeria by France. After a three-year blockade of Algerian ports, the French King
decided to invade the country in 1830, in an attempt to validate his power. Both Western
and Eastern urban centers were colonized, pillaged, and depopulated and the French
troops committed countless atrocities. Although Algerians resisted, the government was
decentralized and the French quickly overtook the nation, implementing mass social,
political, and economic changes. As France continued to transform the nation, an
increasing number of French citizens began to establish roots in Algeria. The colons, or
pied-noirs, grew increasingly powerful as the years passed and became an important
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player in French power politics. The colons not only influenced political institutions but
they also introduced new political ideology to the citizens of Algeria.
The second section of the thesis is an in-depth study on the Algerian War for
Independence which last from 1954 until 1962. There were many political parties which
were pro-independence through peaceful means, yet divisions began to occur as the
younger generations became impatient for results; consequently the Front de Libération
Nationale (FLN) formed with the goal of using force to obtain Algerian selfdetermination. This radical movement of the FLN was a result of both Islamic and French
influences. The first sign of conflict was on November 1, 1954 when there were over
thirty simultaneous attacks on military or police targets by the military branch of the
guerilla organization.
The FLN tactics during this war were unlike anything that the French had
previously encountered. The liberation organization used scare tactics to coerce Algerian
civilians to support it and relied on guerrilla warfare and terrorist techniques to alienate
the French government from the Algerian people. These methods increased in frequency
as the war evolved from a “Phony War” to a full conflict with the massacre at
Philippeville in August 1955. It was not solely the FLN who took violent means to obtain
its goal; the French adopted a policy of immediate, collective, and extremely violent
responses. As the conflict between the rogue party and the European government
escalated, France granted the military unbridled power to defeat the FLN. The military
implemented torture techniques which varied from the use of electrodes to severe
beatings and members of the FLN leadership mysteriously “committing suicide”.
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Finally, after the disintegration of the Fourth Republic of France in 1958 and the
establishment of a new government, headed by Charles de Gaulle, it appeared that there
was progress towards a mutual agreement, with the new President acknowledging that the
self-determination of Algeria was the only possible solution to end the war. After four
more years, which included an attempted French military coup and the continuation of
violence by both sides, the Evian Accords were signed on March 19, 1962 and the
Algerians officially received their independence four months later. Not only did Algeria
lose between 350,000 and 1.5 million citizens in the conflict, but the war justified the use
of violence as a means of obtaining political success. This theory would later be used to
validate the actions of both the FLN and the FIS, as the organizations battled for control
over Algeria’s political landscape.
The third section of the thesis is a detailed case study of the Algerian Civil War,
which began in 1992, under President Chadli Bendjedid. The FLN had been in power
since the end of the War for Independence and used its actions against the French, with
the support of the military, to validate its leadership position. During the late 1970s and
1980s, Algeria was undergoing a severe economic crisis and in an attempt to appease the
citizens, Bendjedid overthrew the single party system and created a new Constitution,
which created a more plural, democratic government. In response to both the economic
crisis and the new opportunity to become involved in politics, a coalition of Islamic
groups was created under the name of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS). After winning
the first round of Parliamentary election at the end of 1991, the FIS was viewed as a
serious threat by many members of the government’s cabinet, including military officials.
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At the risk of losing power with the continuation of the elections, the military leaders
informed Bendjedid that he was to cancel the elections and resign as President.
What resulted was a deeply divided and fragmented government and nation over
the start of a civil war between the Algerian military and the guerrilla fighters of the FIS.
Some armed branches of the FIS, especially the GIA and MIA, believed in jihad and it
adopted a policy of terror attacks against civilians and government institutions alike. The
members would bomb heavily populated places and commit massacres on villages. In
response, the Algerian military implemented a policy of violent, collective punishments.
As the years passed, the violence continued to escalate, with atrocities being committed
by both sides. The Algerian Civil War never had a decisive ending yet the combination of
the fair and free election of President Bouteflika and his later efforts of reconciliation
with leaders of the FIS party, led to the weakening of the FIS and the GIA by 2000. In the
end, the political system of Algeria is certainly more pluralistic and democratic than it
was in the late 1980s, yet the nation lost an estimated 150,000 civilians in the process.
In conclusion, after comparing the conflicts of the War for Independence and the
Algerian Civil War, the thesis draws upon two main suppositions. The first is that,
despite the differences that exist, the FLN of the 1950s and the FIS of the 1990s, as well
as the Algerian and the French administrations, share a number of parallels. It can be
claimed that the FLN adopts the role of the French in the 1990s and makes the evolution
from the victim to the victimizer. The second conclusion is that had France not adopted a
policy of war in the 1950s, Algeria would have been left with a more moderate political
population and the FLN would have been stripped of its political legitimacy; the Algerian
Civil War could have been avoided.
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The first relationship analyzed is the link between the FLN and the FIS insurgent
organizations. There are many examples which could be used to support the claim that
the FIS of the 1990s took many of their policies, strategies, and tactics from the FLN of
the 1950s. Both relied heavily on scare tactics and threats of terrorism to receive the
support of Algerian citizens. The FLN hoped that the French would react to these
activities with unequal, greater responses, which they did; this was the same goal of the
FIS in the 1990s and once again the policy worked.
The second relationship examined is the parallel between both the French and
Algerian administrations. Both the French government and the FLN offered empty
promises of reform in the hopes of placating the population prior to each crisis and when
the threat to its power continued to thrive, both governments turned to policies of
collective reprisals and torture as a means of stifling the opposition. Another shared
reaction of both governments was the role that each gave to the military as the conflict
unfolded. Each provided its armed forces with unbridled power and as a result each
undercut any possibility for a political negotiation with its opponent.
Finally, it can be argued that had France left Algeria in 1955, prior to the
Philippeville Massacre, it may have resulted in a more peaceful outcome for Algerian
politics. The voice of the moderate political party would not have been stifled by the FLN
and it would have provided a balance to the more radical policy of the organization. The
FLN would also not have obtained its claim of legitimacy; the sentiment garnered from
the war carried the party for over thirty years. In the end, this body of work tries to prove
that when finally given the chance to be a free nation, the Algerian administration knew
of no other way to govern than that of its European predecessor while the FIS knew of no
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other way to express its discontent than through a violent revolution like the FLN. Since
Algeria has never been able to create its own history, the colonization by the French
resulted in irreparable damages that lasted far longer than the War for Independence.
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Chapter 1: The History Behind the Franco-Algerian Relationship
Since its inception, Algeria was a nucleus uniting Africa, Europe, the Middle
East, and Asia. The land was formally settled by the Berbers in 4000 B.C.E. and since then
its geographic location and wealth of resources has resulted in six invasions prior to its
colonization by France. The Phoenician-Carthaginians, the Romans, the Vandals, the
Byzantines, the Arabs, and the Turks all conquered the Berbers and each instance
introduced a different aspect to the Algerian culture although the argument can be made
that it was the Arabs and Turks whose impact has had the most longevity.
It was the Arab leader who first tried to overtake the country in 682, Oqba Ibn
Nafi, who converted the Berber leaders to Islam. These Berber leaders brought the
lessons of the Koran back to their tribes and “Islam managed to bring about a melding in
the population between the autochthonous Berber culture and the new Koranic ethic”
(Stora 2001, 3). Islam overcame the pagan belief system that was so prevalent in the early
stages of the nation and created equality amongst all believers. The faith of Islam gave
the Berbers the cohesion that they had previously lacked, one that became increasingly
important in the struggle to regain their independence. The Arabs did not only change the
Berbers’ religion, but also impacted their national identity. Today, almost all Algerians
are Berber in origin, yet only a minority define themselves as Berber, separating
themselves from the Arab culture and identity which has been adopted by the majority of
the population (CIA “World Factbook, Algeria”, 2008). The introduction of Islam is an
example of the impact that an invader can have on a country, yet no invasion has had
more influence on modern-day Algerian politics and society than that of the French.
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During the period of Turkish rule, which lasted for over three hundred years, the
Algerians were able to maintain a certain amount of autonomy. They were able to
preserve their rural tribes and the nation was divided into four different provinces,
Algiers, Titri, Oran, and Constantine, which varied in size and resources. Each province
was further divided into districts and “despite the excessive decentralization of power,
which resulted partly from the segmentary social organization, this pre-colonial state,
with a bureaucratic and military apparatus, managed to govern the population and hence
hold the entire society together for more than three centuries” (Bennoune 1988, 17).
Despite some linguistic differences, the people of Algeria had a relatively communal
culture, sharing a history of tribal communities and a common ideology.
Prior to the French invasion in 1830, Algeria had undergone a complicated
evolution in political institutions; but in 1671 the leadership position of the dey was
created. The dey was selected by the divan, a committee of sixty notables, who restricted
the dey’s power. Serving as a “constitutional autocrat”, the dey only had direct control
over the Algiers region but was able to appoint beys, who governed the other three
provinces (Metz 1993, 20). This political system created a decentralized government and
the beys were primarily left to their own devices. Although the structure led by the dey
controlled the country for over a hundred and fifty years, it was its weakness that
inevitably contributed to the takeover by the French.
The pre-1830s economy of Algeria was already distinctly divided between rural
and urban areas. Algeria’s rural production was based on four primary activities:
agriculture, animal husbandry, horticulture, and the planting of fruit trees. The
geographical conditions of Algeria “fostered a broad specialization of production along
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ecological lines”, further promoting the decentralization of the Algerian government
(Bennoune 1988, 23). There existed a social hierarchy within the pre-colonial rural areas
of Algeria; the population was divided into the big landowners, the peasant cultivators,
and the impoverished or landless producers (Bennoune 1988, 23). Throughout most of
the Turks’ rule, the urban areas of Algeria were prosperous, with “ruling elements,
merchants, artisans, and apprentices” (Bennoune 1988, 27). Although the rural economic
sector of Algeria was relatively protected from European influence, the urban areas of the
nation experienced an increasingly commercial aggressiveness from the European
capitalist nations beginning in the 18th century (Bennoune 1988, 27). This undermined
the economic activities that had previously been the source of funding for urban areas and
as a result “certain coastal cities and towns lost about half of their inhabitants” and the
cities underwent decay (Bennoune 1988, 27). Despite being seemingly backwards
compared to European economic institutions, the pre-colonial economy of Algeria was
relatively prosperous in both urban and rural sectors.
The History of the Franco-Algerian Relationship prior to 1830
France’s interest in expanding its influence in Northern Africa was based on the
two nations’ pre-colonial commercial relationship. The trading relationship between the
Maghreb and France began in the Middle Ages, with its importance being fully realized
in the thirteenth century (Bennoune 1988, 29). For over five hundred years the trading
relationship seemed relatively equal and balanced, yet it was at the end of the eighteenth
century that French merchants began to overtake the North African markets. They had
founded a number of factories and trading establishments in Algeria and exploited its
natural resources, using everything from wheat and wool to coral to increase the wealth
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of the European nation. France, through a pre-established trading company, Compagnie
d’Afrique, began to buy the monopoly on Algeria commerce. The “monopoly over coral
fishing in the eastern coast and the export of wool, animal skins, wax, and wheat through
the port of Bone was granted to France for the amount of 30,000 dollars per year… The
bey of Oran also received 30,000 dollars from a firm for the right of export monopoly”
(Bennoune 1988, 30). The extremity of the “unequal exchange between the two different
economic systems” prompted the French Consul, Deval, to consider the possibility of
France obtaining control over La Calle, the country’s economic stronghold in Algeria
(Bennoune 1988, 31). The domination of La Calle was simply the beginning of France’s
elaborate devices to impose its power on Algeria.
The eventual collision of France and Algeria can be found in the longstanding
economic and political relationship between the two nations. A large number of debts had
been acquired by French merchants who purchased wheat for the French state during the
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. The leaders of France had never intended to repay
Algeria for these loans and the dey became extremely agitated (Stora 2001, 3). The
French viewed this refusal to repay the debts as a means of punishment for the Algerian
Regency, which had supported the Revolutionary cause in 1796. This unfair response was
compounded by the events of a meeting that took place on April 27, 1827 between the
Algerian dey and the French consul, Deval. The two met to discuss the contentious issue
of La Calle and the possibility of France’s occupation. Naturally, the dey was adamantly
opposed to such measures and Deval claimed that the dey struck him on the nose with his
fan in what is known as “The Fan Affair”. Taking offense at such treatment, France broke
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all diplomatic relationships with Algeria and implemented a blockade of the entire sea
coast.
The conquest of Algeria by the French was motivated by both long-term and
short-term goals, some national in nature and others more individually motivated. While
it is true that “by consolidating the influence of France in the western Mediterranean
basin, the government would open their markets and create outlets for trade and nascent
industry”, the short-term goals resulted in the more immediate push for this military
conquest (Stora 2001, 4). By focusing national attention on a struggle abroad, Charles X
expected to promote patriotic sentiment and increase his popularity in the hopes of
reestablishing an absolute monarchy. There also existed the fear “that Britain, which was
pledged to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, would move to fill the
vacuum left by a French pullout” (Metz 1994, 24). The Algerian government was
decentralized and the dey was politically, militarily, and economically weak since there
was still a certain amount of dependence on the Ottoman Empire. Algeria appeared to be
a weak target that would present the French with an easy victory and by acting upon this
weakness, the French were able to prevent the British from increasing its colonial power.
These factors combined led to a military conquest that took several unexpected turns over
the years.
The Invasion and Colonization of Algerian Urban Centers
After three years of an unsuccessful blockade, Charles X initiated a military
expedition against Algiers with the hope of saving his monarchical rule. On June 12,
1830, thirty-four thousand French soldiers landed 27 kilometers west of Algiers,
beginning what was to be a long conflict between the two nations. The dey responded
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with seven thousand janissaries, nineteen thousand soldiers from Constantine and Oran
and seventeen thousand Kabyles (Metz 1994, 23). Although Algeria sent more troops into
the conflict, France had superior artillery and was able to organize more effectively; as a
result Algiers was conquered after three weeks. As the dey fled to exile, the French began
their “civilizing mission” with raping the women of the city, looting, desecrating
mosques, and destroying cemeteries (Metz 1994, 23). Within one year of the initial
occupation, Algiers had lost thirty thousand inhabitants, who were either killed or forced
into exile (Bennoune 1988, 37). Both Western and Eastern urban centers were colonized,
pillaged, and depopulated in the same manner. Examples can be found in the city of
Constantine, which lost ten thousand inhabitants, or Masacra, a city whose initial
population was ten thousand, of which nine thousand were killed (Bennoune 1988, 38).
The occupation of the urban areas of Algeria is the first of the four stages of French
colonization, which lasted from 1830 until 1839. The urban areas resisted but since there
were no centralized forces, they fell quickly and were shown little mercy by the colonial
powers.
The Expansion and Opposition of French Influence in Rural Areas
The second stage of the French occupation was the colonial army’s attempt to
extend its sovereignty across rural Algeria. Roughly lasting from 1840 until 1847, the
French encountered many difficulties and conflicts during the implementation of its
plans. The most successful opposition that immediately followed the defeat of Algiers in
1830 was found in the region of Constantine and was led by the bey, Ahmad ibn
Muhammad. He initiated radical policy reforms and created a uniformity and solidarity
within his realm of leadership in an attempt to increase the strength of locality to defend
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against the French. He replaced Turkish leaders with local leaders, made Arabic the
official language, and attempted to reform finances according to the precepts of Islam.
The French had to retreat from Constantine in 1836 but it was captured the following
year with a renewed effort.
Until 1840, the French adopted a policy of limited occupation, during which the
French would occupy the main cities in the country but would exercise their dominion
over the rest of nation through native rulers. This policy,
took concrete shape in 1834 when the position of governor-general for Algeria
was created… yet the policy of limited occupation failed because it was
incompatible with two dynamic elements in the Algerian situation: the military
resistance of Algerian Muslims to French rule, and the uncontrollable ambitions
aroused in a technically advanced community exercising power over a less
advanced society (Abun-Nasr 1987, 253).
Although Ahmad bey did implement policies that had a foundation in Islamic beliefs and
led efforts to counter those of the French, he was not the main leader of the Islamic holy
revolution against the colonizers.
The French did not only experience challengers in the East with Ahmad bey; they
also faced an Islamic-based revolt in the West. In 1832, in the city of Oran, the “superior
of a religious brotherhood, Muhyi ad Din… launched attacks against the French and their
allies” (Metz 1994, 25). Seeing as he was becoming weak with age, that same year the
tribal elders elected ad Din’s young son, Abd al Qadir, to lead the jihad. “A devout and
austere marabout, he was also a cunning political leader and a resourceful warrior” who
quickly gained support throughout Africa (Metz 1994, 25). He began to implement his
plan of building a Muslim state with the interior communities of the nation and by 1839,
Abd al Qadir controlled more than two-thirds of the country (Metz 1994, 25). He was
able to collect taxes, maintain armed forces, and stimulate economic activity for the land
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under his control. The French in Algeria were concerned about this growing Muslim state
and the possibility of it restricting European expansion; adding to their concerns were the
numerous battles between Abd al Qadir’s forces and French troops. The colonizers’
unease continued to grow and, two years after signing a peace treaty recognizing Abd al
Qadir’s regime, the French provoked the Muslim government by occupying Constantine.
Although Abd al Qadir initially fought off the French troops, the European nation’s
resources and manpower began to weaken his efforts; by 1840 one-third of France’s
soldiers were stationed in Algeria. By 1843 the Muslim state fell and Abd al Qadir
surrendered on December 23, 1847. He represents one of the individuals behind the
Algerian opposition and is thought of by the Algerians as the first hero of Algerian
independence.
Colonization and Military Control, 1847-1871
From the time of the surrender of Abd al Qadir in 1847 until 1871, the actions of
the French colonial army focused solely on severing all of Algeria’s former economic
and political ties. By 1848 nearly all of Northern Algeria was under French control and
the country was forced to uproot and transform its administration. It was during this time
that the drastic inequality between the French and the Algerians started to be put into
practice. Louis-Philippe’s reign over France’s constitutional monarchy was overthrown
this same year and “the new government of the Second Republic ended Algeria’s status
as a colony and declared the occupied lands an integral part of France” (Metz 1994, 29).
Three of the four main regions, Algiers, Oran, and Constantine, were organized as French
départements and were brought under a common civilian government. French citizens
were able to vote for their representatives on councils as well as their mayors, whereas
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the “Muslims had to be appointed, could not hold more than one-third of council seats,
and could not serve as mayors or assistant mayors” (Metz 1994, 29). Those who lived
outside of the zones settled by the colons, or French, were able to function under a régime
du sabre, where local Muslim administrations were able to have control of government
affairs, but were forced to report to the French military commanders.
With another change in French leadership came another set of changes towards
the Algerian colony. Napoleon III took power in 1852 and was “profoundly impressed
with the nobility and virtue of the tribal chieftains and shocked by the self-serving
attitude of the colon leaders” (Metz 1994, 29). Unlike many of the colons, Napoleon III
wanted to limit the expansion of the French as well as the interaction between the
Europeans and the Muslims. He planned on promoting the Arab race, claiming that
“‘Algeria is not a colony… but an Arab kingdom… I am as much the emperor of the
Arabs as of the French!’” (Stora 2001, 5). His desire to be the roi des Arabes (King of the
Arabs) in the royaume Arabe (Arab kingdom) led to the initiation of two different decrees
which affected the “tribal structure, land tenure, and legal status of Muslims in French
Algeria” (Metz 1994, 29). Although Napoleon III meant to protect the Algerians with
these decrees, they furthered the already palpable separation between the colons and
Muslims in the nation.
The first of these two decrees was executed in 1863 and directly addressed the
issue of land and ownership. The goal was to renounce the state’s claims to tribal lands
and eventually end in private ownership for tribes, resulting in the protection of their land
from the colons. Unfortunately there was little accountability for this ruling and French
officials who were sympathetic with colons took much of the land that they had surveyed
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into the public domain. In addition, many of those tribal leaders who had received some
part of land quickly sold their communal property with the hopes of making a quick
profit.
Napoleon III visualized “three distinct Algerias: a French colony, an Arab
country, and a military camp, each with a distinct form of government” and the second
declaration was meant to highlight the differences and separation between the three (Metz
1994, 30). It stated that, if the Algerians became French citizens, then they would be
granted the protection of French law. Yet in order to gain citizenship they had to accept
the full jurisdiction of the French legal code and therefore reject the importance of the
religious courts; in other words “a Muslim had to renounce his religion in order to
become a French citizen” (Metz 1994, 30). Although it was meant to propose an option to
those who would like to be included under the protection and legal system of the French,
it created an immense feeling of resentment among Muslims, with fewer than three
thousand of them choosing to obtain citizenship.
France’s Second Empire ended in 1870 when the Prussians captured Napoleon III
and the colons in Algeria viewed this change in leadership as an opportunity to overthrow
the military regime, establish a civilian controlled administration, and completely
immerse Algeria into France. One of France’s ministers, Adolphe Crémieux, was given
the task of uniting the two countries and issued a series of decrees “providing for
representation of the Algerian départements in the National Assembly of France and
confirming colon control over local administration” (Metz 1994, 31). The Crémieux
Decrees granted blanket citizenship to all Algerian Jews, totaling forty-thousand
individuals. This created a distinct division between the Algerian Muslim population and
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the Algerian Jewish population that did not exist prior to the colonial period. This decree
segregated the Jewish population from the rest of the nation because the Muslims
recognized them as members of the colon sector whereas the colons saw little difference
between Algerian Muslims and Jews.
Riots broke out across Algeria in 1871, after the global demand for grain had
pushed the price of Algerian wheat to European levels and Algerian farmers sold their
crops to speculators, depleting the reserves that were needed when crops failed. A famine
ensued and with it came serious consequences; for example, in a three year period, “it
was estimated that twenty percent of the Muslim population of Constantine died” (Metz
1994, 31). In addition to the riots, France’s loss of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in 1871
led to extreme land reforms due to a new pressure for the French government to find a
place for the five thousand refugees from Alsace-Lorraine. This sudden need of land was
the perfect reason to impose harsh restrictions on the Muslims, indirectly providing
punishment from the riots. Although the Senatus Consultus of 1863 was not overly
successful in the distribution of land titles to Arabs, the French used the Warnier Laws to
fulfill their need of land and reverse what few land titles had been granted to the Arabs.
Initiated by the leader of the colon delegation, Auguste Warnier, these laws resulted in
the “facilitation of the private transfer of land to settlers and continued the Algerian
state’s appropriation of land from the local population and the distribution to settlers”
(Metz 1994, 32). These land reforms doubled the amount of land owned by Europeans as
well as the number of settlers in a decade. As a result of the land exchange, “tens of
thousands of unskilled Muslims, who had been uprooted from their land, wandered into
the cities or to colon farming areas in search of work” therefore lowering the price of
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labor and furthering the inequality between the colon and indigenous populations (Metz
1994, 31).
The Supremacy of the Colons in Algeria, 1871- 1914
After the revolts of 1871 and the land reforms of 1873, colons were given
complete control of Algeria in all sectors. The Algerians had little alternative but to
“attempt to live in a society whose political and economic structures were geared to serve
the interests of the settler community, and whose educational system was designed to
submerge the Arab-Islamic identity” (Abun-Nasr 1987, 268). Government representation
in Algeria’s National Assembly was just one example of the inequality that permeated
every aspect of life in the country. The Muslim population had virtually no representation
on both the national and local level. Because of the religious requirements imposed on
individuals who qualified as French citizens, only 50,000 Algerians were eligible to vote
by 1915 (Metz 1994, 32). Reforms, regardless of how modest, were impossible to pass
because of the power of the serving colons and their unwillingness to ameliorate the lives
of the Algerians. It was important for the French-established, Algerian government to
vote in a manner which supported the prominent attitudes and ideas of the colon
population in order to avoid anarchy; “their support was important to any government’s
survival” (Metz 1994, 32). Because of the land reforms that were able to be passed, the
colons owned thirty percent of the total land, which included the majority of land that
was fertile and accessible to irrigation. This allowed them to produce nearly two-thirds of
the total agricultural exports just thirty years after installing their own civilian
government.
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Not only were the colonial powers overtaking some of the most lucrative sectors
of the Algerian economy, they were also increasing taxes for the native population.
Despite their significant decrease in wages, the Muslim population was taxed
considerably more than European settlers. By 1909 Muslims constituted almost ninety
percent of the population yet they produced only twenty percent of the total income.
Regardless of this vast difference in prosperity, the Muslims paid nearly seventy percent
of the direct taxes (Metz 1994, 33). Despite paying the majority of taxes, the Muslim
population did not reap the benefits of their efforts. The colon officials had control over
the taxes and therefore used the funds to benefit the colon towns, which “had handsome
municipal buildings and paved streets lined with trees, fountains, and statues” (Metz
1994, 33). The disproportional distribution of tax burdens and tax revenues continued the
sentiment of resentment that was becoming increasingly popular, even among those
individuals who were pro-French.
The colons used taxes and land reforms to gain power over the Algerians through
economic means and viewed education as a way to decrease the influence of the Islamic
ideology that was so important to many Algerians. This was one of the final social
domains in which change was needed for a complete separation from pre-colonial
Algeria. For a population who had previously relied on religious schools, even for the
most basic reading and writing instruction, “the colonial regime proved severely
detrimental to the overall education for Algerian Muslims” (Metz 1994, 33). The colons
had appropriated the lands upon which the religious foundations, that created much of the
income to support religious institutions, were located. After cutting off the main source of
Islamic funding in the nation, officials refused to allocate money to properly maintain
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mosques and schools. The colons were spending five times the amount on European
education as they were for Muslims, who had five times more children of school age
(Metz 1994, 34). The lack of educational funding resulted in a spill-over effect; few
Muslims received the education needed to become teachers and therefore Muslim schools
became staffed primarily by French instructors, resulting in the continuous decline of
Arabic studies. In 1890, a new effort was put forth to educate a small number of Muslims
with Europeans in the French school system. Within a generation, a new class of Muslims
had emerged. Known as the évolués, this group of well-educated Muslims had accepted
French citizenship despite the constraints. Although not initially well-received by the
majority of the Algerian Muslims, it was in this new class and its close interaction with
the French that a new Algerian self-consciousness matured.
Nationalism and Political Movements amongst the Algerian Population, 1914-1954
The events of World War I left the entire population of Algeria in a state of shock
and truly tested the allegiance of both the colons and native Algerians. The pieds noirs, or
colons, naturally felt the need to defend their nation and twenty-two thousand of them
perished during the war. Despite their anger towards the French, the indigenous
population’s role became more important than that of the colons. Recruitment led to
173,000 Muslim soldiers, of which 25,000 died as well as the requisitioning of 119,000
Muslim Algerians who were meant to satisfy the demand for labor in French cities (Stora
2001, 12). When the war was over Algerian political ideology was beginning to undergo
a drastic revolution, starting with those workers and soldiers who had experienced firsthand the rights of the French. Woodrow Wilson’s idea of self-determination, the end of
the Ottoman Empire, the growing movement of pan-Arabism, and the sudden influx of
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Algerian workers to post-war France all led to the creation and development of the idea
of national independence and created a sudden solidarity among the Algerian population
that it had never experience before.
During the post-war period a number of political movements and organizations
began to form, varying from integrationists to independence groups. One of the earliest
political movements came in the form of the Federation of Elected Natives (Fédération
des Élus Indigènes- FÉI), a group which stemmed from an earlier political faction, the
Young Algerians (established by Ferhat Abbas).Primarily comprised of évolués, the FÉI
was an integrationist group which lobbied for assimilation with the French pending the
rights of full citizenship to Muslims, without renouncing their religious status, equal pay
for Algerian government employees, the abolition of travel restrictions between the two
countries and electoral reform (Metz 1994, 36). A counter to this group was the Star of
North Africa (Étoile Nord-Africain, known as Star), the first political organization that
openly demanded for Algerian independence (Stora 2001, 17). Established by North
African workers in Paris and led by Messali Hadj, it promoted separation from France,
freedom of press, a parliament chosen through universal suffrage, the confiscation of
large land estates, and the re-institution of Arabic schools (Metz, 1994, 36). The party
was banned in 1929 and reformed in 1933 only to later dissolve in 1937. That same year,
Messali Hadj formed the Party of Algerian People (Parti du Peuple Algérien- PPA), a
movement to mobilize the working class in Algeria and use political action to combat
colonization. These groups looked to France as the inspiration for their ideological
models and it was the First World War which allowed the Algerians to gain experience in
a political atmosphere that was so unlike their own.
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While some political groups were formed with the sense of nationalistic pride as
their foundation, others were established on the nation’s principles of Islamic and Arabic
roots. Beginning in the 1920s the “reform ulama, or religious scholars, promoted a
purification of Islam in Algeria and a return to the Quran” (Metz 1994, 37). Establishing
their own schools, they stressed the importance of the Arab language and culture, unlike
those institutions that had been operated by the French. The reformist ulama created the
Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama (Association des Uléma Musulmans AlgériensAUMA). The AUMA gained in popularity and “struck a cord among Muslim masses,
with whom it had closer ties than the other nationalist organizations” (Metz 1994, 37).
After being seen as a threat, the AUMA was no longer able to preach in official mosques,
therefore limiting their power. The pieds-noirs rejected any sort of reform movement,
including those that were pro-French, and forced France and other European nations to
support their position of control over the Algerian administration and police forces.
Algerian Muslims once again rallied to the aid of the French during World War II,
yet the establishment of the Vichy Regime and the increased popularity of the idea of
Algerian independence would forever change the Franco-Algerian relationship. The
Algerian administration enforced the anti-Semitic laws that were imposed by the Vichy
regime, stripping the Algerian Jews, as well as the few Muslims who had conformed,
their rights of citizenship. After the fall of the Vichy regime in Algeria at the end of 1942,
France pleaded to the Muslim population for the re-enforcement of troops and Ferhat
Abbas, former leader of the Young Algerians, as well as twenty-four other Muslim
leaders replied that they would be willing to fight as long as they were able to hold a
conference and develop their own political, economic, and social institutions within the
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French framework. The resulting Manifesto of the Algerian People was enormously
influenced by Abbas, “who had abandoned assimilation as a viable alternative to selfdetermination” (Metz 1994, 40). The document claims that “The French colony only
admits equality with Muslim Algeria on one level; sacrifice on the battlefield” (Horne
2006, 42). This clean break from the idea of assimilation called for the “immediate and
effective participation of Muslims in the government and the establishment of a
constitution guaranteeing inter alia, liberty and equality for all Algerians, the suppression
of feudal property- as well as various other planks borrowed from the more radical
platform of Messali” (Horne 2006, 42). Although the Manifesto was rejected by the
French government, the conference resulted in the joining of Abbas and Hadj with the
organization, Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty (Amis du Manifeste et de la LibertéAML). The AML would clearly define the split between the native Algerians and the
pieds-noirs.
Amid the strong sentiment of animosity towards the French, social unrest grew
amongst all social classes as a result of a poor wheat harvest, the shortage of
manufactured goods, and severe unemployment; thousands of hungry peasants streamed
towards the cities where they were met with a lack of jobs and were forced to congregate
around soup kitchens (Stora 2001, 21). It was under these pretences that the AML
organized demonstrations in most Algerian cities on May 8, 1945. After being told that
they were not allowed to promote their nationalist sentiments during the protests, the
marchers carried banners that read, “Down with fascism and colonialism” and police in
Sétif opened fire on them (Stora 2001, 21). The marchers countered these attacks and
over a hundred Europeans were killed. Word of the violence spread across the nation and
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villagers attacked colon settlements and government buildings. On May 10th, “the
authorities organized a ‘war of reprisals’ which turned into a massacre” (Stora 2001, 23).
Shootings and summary executions as well as blanket bombings were carried out and
although French estimates state that 1,500 Muslims died as a result (Metz 1994, 42),
Algerian nationalists claim that the figure was upwards of 45,000 individuals (Stora
2001, 22). This act of violence created an irreparable rift between the Muslim majority
and the European minority; it set the stage for the commencement of the Algerian War
for independence nine years later.
Although the AML coalition was not formally recognized by the French, the work
of Messali Hadj did not come to a halt. The political leader continued to operate the PPA
as a clandestine organization until 1946, when he reconstituted it under a new name. The
Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (Movement for the Triumph
of Democratic Liberties, MTLD) continued Hadj’s quest of Algerian independence
through peaceful means and was founded with the goals of the Manifesto in mind. It
desired to bring together “those Muslims who were still committed to evolutionary
change” (Evans 2007, 53). After a year of activity, the most militant Algerians, “those
clearly committed to the armed struggle” were drawn to the Organisations Spéciale (OS),
the paramilitary group for the MTLD (Evans 2007, 53). Formed secretly in 1947, the core
of this sub-division was comprised of a group of young men in their twenties, who were
from a literate artisan or middle-class background. Ahmed Ben Bella, Hocine Ait Ahmed,
and Mohammed Boudiaf were all members of the OS, which trained approximately 4,500
men before mounting its first action. The organization was dismantled by 1951, yet many
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of its former members remained active in politics and took shelter in other Middle
Eastern nations, including Egypt.
After the Organisations Spéciale disbanded, the previous members feared that the
nationalist movement had lost its momentum. The ex-militants believed that the MTLD
was playing into the “hands of colonialism and reinforced their conviction that what was
needed was a totally new organization which would prepare the way for an armed
insurrection” (Evans 2007, 55). The same young men, including Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed,
and Boudiaf, formed the Comite Révolutionnaire pour l’Unité et L’Action in March
1954. They “were under no illusions about the scale of the task confronting them but their
confidence was bolstered by the French defeat in Indo-China” (Evans 2007, 55). The
group was renamed the Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN)
on October 10, 1954. Since many of the leaders of the FLN were veterans of the French
military and former activists in the MTLD, it is not surprising that the organization
created a military-style structure with a military equivalent, the Armée de Libération
Nationale (ALN). It would be the ALN that would commit many of the acts of terror in
the war against France.
While the FLN was beginning to take shape, the MTLD continued its struggle
towards self-determination. On November 4, 1954 the Council of Ministers disbanded the
MTLD and several hundred nationalist leaders were arrested. Those who were not, were
forced to hide underground or join the guerrilla forces of the FLN. The militant
organization intended to benefit from the dissolution of Hadj’s party, hoping to take
ownership of the weapons that it possessed as well as its connections abroad. Messali
Hadj was adamantly opposed to the use of violence against the French as a means of
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obtaining political liberation and established the Mouvement National Algerien (National
Algerian Movement, MNA), which was the only socialist faction to not eventually join
the cause of the FLN.
War of Independence, 1954-1962
On the morning of November 1, 1954 the National Liberation Front began a war
that would shake the foundations of France’s Fourth Republic and inevitably lead to its
collapse. Launching attacks against military installations, police posts, warehouses,
communications facilities, and public utilities around the nation, members of the FLN
called on Muslims to “restore the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social,
within the framework of Islam” (Metz 1994, 44). The response from the French was
minimal and few thought that the nation had just entered into another war (Stora 2001,
38). This first year can be referred to as a “Phony War”, a time where the FLN was able
to spread its campaign throughout the countryside and the French could attempt to
implement reforms to pacify the Muslims (Stora 2001, 41). Jacques Soustelle, who was
the Governor of Algeria beginning on February 11, 1955, was known for being a liberal
and he tried to understand the plight of the Algerian Muslims. Trying to balance the
demands of the FLN with France’s allegiance to the colons, he promised integration and
reforms- but it was too late, and on August 20, 1955, the “Phony War” ended and the real
conflict began.
This watershed event was based on a poorly planned revolt where several
thousand peasants and agricultural workers rushed to thirty villages, including four major
cities: Collo, Constantinois, Guelma, and Philippeville. At first, the clash at Philippeville
followed the standard FLN policy of attacking solely government and military targets.
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Then there was a dramatic escalation of violence where the FLN and its supporters killed
one hundred and twenty three people, of which seventy-one were European citizens. The
repression for the Philippeville massacre, which was immediate, collective, and violent,
set the standard for the rest of the war and although the official death toll was 1,273, the
FLN has put forth a figure of 12,000 Muslims losing their lives to the French following
the attack. It was this incident that ended all French “peace-keeping missions” and
resulted in a state of emergency that provided carte blanche for the French army.
The tactics used during this war from both the French and the FLN were
increasingly brutal. Recognizing the fact that it had smaller troop numbers and less
technologically advanced weapons, the FLN resorted to guerrilla tactics. Focusing on
“ambushes and night raids and avoiding direct contact with superior French firepower,
the internal forces targeted army patrols, military encampments, police posts, and colon
farms, mines, and factories, as well as transportation and communications facilities”
(Metz 1994, 48). The French frequently resorted to means of torture and brutal tactics in
the quest to maintain their colonial holdings, yet the FLN also would commonly kidnap
individuals and ritually murder and mutilate captured members of the French military,
colons, suspected collaborators, and traitors. In addition to torture tactics, the French also
applied
the principle of collective responsibility to villages suspected of sheltering,
supplying, cooperating with the guerrillas… they also initiated a program of
concentrating large segments of the rural population, including whole villages, in
camps under military supervision to prevent them from aiding the rebels (Metz
1994, 51).
Living conditions in the camps were poor and in the three years that this tactic was used,
over two million individuals were moved from their homes, and were unable to
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reestablish themselves economically or socially. The French changed their tactics in 1958
as its government began to collapse and adopted a policy of using mobile forces to
complete search-and-destroy missions.
The hope of ending the war came with the fall of the Fourth Republic and the
establishment of a more liberal French leader. Regardless of citizenship, many
individuals were pleased to see Charles de Gaulle come into power and felt that his
freethinking views were the key to ending the violence between France and Algeria. With
his proposed social, economic, and political reforms, he was the improving the Muslim
situation while weakening the power of the FLN in Algeria. In September 1958 all
Muslims were granted the right to vote and one year later de Gaulle “uttered the words
‘self-determination’, which he envisioned as leading to majority rule in an Algeria
formally associated with France” (Metz 1994, 53). Convinced that de Gaulle had
betrayed them, the colons, backed by certain units of the army, staged riots in January
1960 and began enacting their own terrorist activities, directed at both Muslims and progovernmental Europeans.
The end of the war came with the “Generals’ Putsch”, which marked the turning
point of the official attitude toward the Algerian war. The leaders of this movement, who
were French generals who had been banned or transferred from Algeria and supported the
continuation of the war, formed the Organisation Armée Secrete, or OAS, and intended to
seize control of Algeria and topple the de Gaulle regime. The organization garnered the
support of the colon population and, although fear swept both France and Algeria, the
putsch was terminated after four days. Despite the collapse of the revolt, the organization
continued to thrive and began to commit violent attacks against both Muslims and
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government employees, in the hopes of promoting its objective of resisting Algerian
disengagement. It was after this event that de Gaulle became “prepared to abandon the
colons, the group that no previous French government could have written off” (Metz
1994, 54). Talks with the FLN opened at Évian and a cease fire took effect on March 19,
1962. On July 1, 1962 nearly 6 million of the total 6.5 million Algerian electorate “cast
their ballots in the referendum on independence and the vote was nearly unanimous”
(Metz 1994, 55); two days later the President of France declared Algeria a free nation.
The total cost of the War for Independence has been an issue of contention for
years. The FLN estimated that nearly three hundred thousand individuals had died during
the eight year revolution, yet Algerian sources later raised that figure to nearly 1.5 million
people. The French claimed that their losses totaled to eighteen thousand individuals with
over ten thousand Europeans dying in forty-two thousand recorded terrorist incidents
(Metz 1994, 55). There was also a mass exodus of colons after the signing of the truce
and, at the end of the subsequent year, fewer than thirty thousand Europeans chose to
remain in Algeria. Yet it was not simply the material destruction of land, the collapse of
the economy, or loss of life that impacted the country. Even after Algerian independence
the relationship between Algeria and France has been tense. With an intertwining of
interests yet distinct differences, Algeria celebrates the day it received its independence,
whereas France did not even publicly acknowledge that a war was fought in Algeria until
1999. Within the country of Algeria itself, the war for independence legitimized the use
of unrestricted force to obtain a justifiable goal. The determination of the FLN to regain
sovereignty would be repeated thirty years later in the Algerian Civil War, with its
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determination to hold onto the position in the government and the extreme force that
would be used to achieve its goals.
The Lasting Impacts of French Colonialism on Modern-day Algeria
The effects of French colonialism on modern day Algeria are numerous in the
social, economic, and political sectors, yet there are also differences that cannot be
quantified. When Algiers first fell in 1830, the systematic confiscation of land and the
increasing inflation due to the introduction of the French currency led to “the rise of the
modern Algerian proletariat” (Bennoune 1988, 37). These individuals suddenly had no
other means of survival than to hire out their labor on a day-to-day basis. Some Algerians
feel that, “colonization resulted in the expropriation of most of the Algerian producers as
well as in the deconstruction-transformation of both the pre-existing urban system and the
rural landscape” (Bennoune 1988, 39). It was not simply the urban areas that felt the
impact of French colonization; “rural colonization was the most important single factor in
the destruction of traditional society” (Metz 1994, 24). The seizures of land from the
countryside undermined Algeria’s pre-colonial economic and social systems and those
individuals who had sustained themselves with the field of agriculture were no longer
able to do so when the “primary natural resources were taken from the native producers”
(Bennoune 1988, 52). In addition to the rise of a proletariat class was the formation of an
Algerian upper-middle class with the évolués. Receiving a French education, this group
of individuals formed the foundations of political resistance and began the establishment
of political movements that would become so divisive to Algerian life in later years.
Not only did the French alter Algeria’s economic and social structure but they
also impacted Algerians’ religious viewpoints and morals concerning war. Firstly, the
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Arab-Islamic identity became completely separate from life in Algeria. The French
indirectly closed all Islamic schools by refusing them funding and asked Algerians to
relinquish their Muslim identity in order to gain French citizenship. Few Muslims were
willing to go to such lengths and, as a result, the foundations of a more extreme religious
sect were laid. The Algerians further embraced their religion and morals due to the
frequency and intensity of war crimes both in the French plan of colonization and the
Algerians’ struggle for independence. During the 1800s the French adopted strategies
such as “scorched earth”, where they burned everything down, or “smoke out”, where
they trapped and burned soldiers in caves (Bennoune 1988, 40). These war crimes, “were
not committed because the ethical standards of the 19th century Frenchmen had
degenerated; they were motivated by the firm conviction that the colonization of Algeria
would be in the best interests of France” (Bennoune 1988, 40). This is an important result
of French colonization because it laid the foundation of the ideology of the FLN, which
was the belief that extreme violence was justifiable if it resulted in political success.
The French and Algerians’ relationship is one that has been so detrimental to both
countries yet ties will never be completely severed. The violent history between the two
cannot be denied although some French and American historians have downplayed the
events that occurred during that hundred year period. The French had a massive impact
on their colony, some good, such as the exposure to democracy and political movements,
and other negative, such as the justification for extreme violence. Although it was solely
the Algerians who caused the civil war that tore their nation apart, it is important to
understand the history of colonial Algeria and the foundations that the French laid that
allowed such a conflict to come about.
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Chapter 2: The Algerian Civil War, 1954-1962
Prior to the start of the war in 1954, it was difficult to separate the countries of
France and Algeria. The colony of Algeria constituted three French departments and as
the French Minister of the Interior said, “Algeria is France” (Stora 2001, 30). After 125
years of controlling Algeria the invested interest between the two nations was great;
nearly one million Europeans had moved to the North African country to establish a new
life and many Muslims had rushed to aid the French in both World Wars. With the
immigration of Algerians to France came a new understanding of socialist ideas,
however, and the desire for independence began to grow.
The French Republic saw itself as assimilationist yet millions of Muslim
Algerians felt that their citizenship was a sham since they voted in a college that was
separate from the Europeans (Stora 2001, 30). Muslims were beginning to feel that total
independence would be the only way to fully undo the unfair treatment and policies of
the French. Political parties, such as the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic
Liberties (MTLD) which were pro-independence through peaceful means, became
divided and the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) formed with the goal of using force
to obtain Algerian self-determination. This distinct separation in ideology forever
changed the history of Algeria.
The Members and Doctrine of the Front de Libération Nationale
Prior to November 1, 1954, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was a
relatively unknown association that was guided by a group of young individuals who
were rebelling against French colonialism. The actions of the All Saints’ Day attack was
conducted internally by six men: Larbi Ben M’Hidi, Didouche Mourad, Rabah Bitat,
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Krim Belkacem, Mohamed Boudiaf, and Mostefa Ben Boulaid (Stora 2001, 36). There
was also a movement outside of Algeria, in Cairo, which was led by Hocine Ait Ahmed,
Ahmed Ben Bella, and Mohammed Khider (Stora 2001, 36). They were all originally
members of the Parti du Peuple (PPA), and later the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des
Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD), and had contributed to the group’s efforts to mobilize
the working class in Algeria and use political action to combat colonization. These young
activists became “advocates of armed struggle and clashed violently with the old head of
the PPA, Messali Hadj”, leading to the creation of the FLN (Stora 2001, 36). Many of the
individuals who shaped the FLN were educated men who came from well-known rural
families that were becoming “affected by the general downward mobility at work in
Algerian society” (Stora 2001, 37). Several of the original leaders had also fought as
French soldiers during World War II and their formal training allowed them to
understand “intimately the strengths and weaknesses of the French military”, a fact that
was greatly to their advantage and aided their success (Millen 2008, 36). They hailed
from various regions in Algeria, including Marnia, Kabyle, and Constantine. They also
had differing backgrounds; Ben Bella was a merchant’s son who rose to the rank of
Sergeant-Major in the French army, Hocine Ait Ahmed was the son of a Kabyle lawyer
and a formidable orator, and Mohammed Boudiaf was also a French army veteran who
was afflicted with chronic tuberculosis from a young age (Evans 2007, 54). With such
diversity, the organization was founded on a policy of collective leadership, which once
again worked to its advantage since it became much more difficult for the French to
isolate and target so many individuals. These men changed the general outlook on
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Algerian independence, feeling that slow, collective work was outdated and ineffective
and that one must turn to military action to gain results.
The radical movement of the FLN was a result of both French and Islamic
influences. The first pro-independence activists were based in Paris and their “French
experience taught them the models of organization and the rudiments of socialist
ideology by which they would analyze the situation of their nation…it put them in
contact with industrial and urban models of life” (Stora 2001, 65). Another factor to
consider during this time is that almost all Algerians were faithful to their religious
customs. “Islam was both a combat ideology and a social project” and took the form of a
nationalist philosophy (Stora 2001, 66). An example of this can be found in the text of a
tract that was broadcast on Radio Cairo following the first attacks. The tract introduced
the people of Algeria to the FLN and stated the goal of the FLN as “National
Independence through the restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and
social, within the framework of the principles of Islam” (Evans 2007, 57). One of the
internal objectives also stated in the same document was the “pursuit of North African
unity in its national Arab-Islamic context” (Evans 2007, 57). The party was aware of the
contradictions that existed within this theory but used the main goal of independence as a
means of deflecting questioning.
The Start of the “Phony War” (1954-1955) and the French Reforms that Followed
Early on the morning of November 1, 1954, Algeria plunged into a battle for its
freedom. Across the country there were over thirty simultaneous attacks on military or
police targets from the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), otherwise known as the
military branch of the FLN, which had little more than four hundred miscellaneous small
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arms (Millen 2008, 28). Although the attacks resulted in the deaths of seven people,
overall the assault on the police stations, barracks, and industrial plants did not have the
impact that the revolutionary fighters had hoped for (Stora 2001, 35). Few weapons were
procured and “militarily, the operation was a complete failure”; in addition the hoped-for
popular uprising failed to follow (Millen 2008, 28). Although the ALN presented itself as
a disorganized military operation with a small arsenal, this event was not reflective of the
political groundwork that the FLN had already established in certain regions of Algeria.
The immediate response of the French to this outburst was minimal. François
Mitterand, Minister of the Interior, sent just an additional six hundred men to be at the
disposal of the thirty-five hundred troops who were already stationed in the colony. The
“events”, as they were referred to in France, received little press attention, and few
French citizens believed that their country had just entered another war (Stora 2001, 36).
The government greatly underestimated the capabilities of the members of the FLN,
whom they viewed simply as another tribal group, and “the misreading of the situation
helps explain the French incremental, expedient, and short-sighted response” (Millen
2008, 28). The French government’s actions would attempt to balance three goals:
maintaining a strong appearance domestically for the citizens who cared little for the
colony of Algeria, the appeasement of the colons in Algeria, and the avoidance any
collateral damage that would anger either group of citizens.
Just a few short weeks after the first signs of conflict in Algeria, Tunisia and
Morocco gained internal autonomy, leading to a greater interest and further justification
for the work done by the members of the FLN party. It became clear that “the Arab world
was under the influence of the Nasserian revolution” which was beginning to “shake the
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colonial empire” (Stora 2001, 39). After the initial attack, the FLN continued with its
provocations while the French retaliated with “mass arrests, false imprisonment, and
collective punishment” as well as an increased military presence in the country (Millen
2008, 29). These additional troops and military operations were accompanied by
proposed reforms with the hopes of forming an agreement. During the month of January
1955, the French government proposed the creation of a school administration in Algiers
that would give Muslim Algerians access to posts of responsibility in the public sector, as
well as the reduction of the gap in Algerian and European salaries (Europeans had a gross
income that was twenty-eight times that of the typical Algerian citizen), the initiation of
major public works projects, and the formal recognition of the state of economic poverty
in many regions throughout Algeria (Stora 2001, 39). The positive changes proposed
were barely discussed after the French deputies delivered a non-confidence vote to
Premier Pierre Mendes-France on February 5, 1955 by a margin of 319 to 273 (Stora
2001, 40). Political parties sided with the colons and did not approve of the changes that
were proposed to improve the lives of the Muslim Algerians.
Jacques Soustelle became the new governor of Algeria; a Gaullist, he had a
reputation as being an open and liberal man. He formed a more diverse cabinet and his
willingness to explore new possibilities regarding the French-Algerian relationship made
him unpopular amongst those individuals already in power in Algiers, who feared that a
change in the Franco-Algerian relationship would mean a loss of their power. In the first
few months of his term, he “labored to understand the discontent of the Muslim
population” and through his trips to the troubled regions he came to understand that this
was not a conventional battle (Stora 2001, 40). He realized that it was going to take more
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than military deployments to truly win this fight but his efforts were fruitless and the
National Assembly strengthened the powers of the army and authorized the
“displacement of contaminate populations to ‘settlement camps’” (Stora 2001, 40). These
camps further alienated the Muslim population from the French and strengthened the
cause of the FLN.
The FLN Tactics During the First Years of War
The FLN tactics of this time differed from anything that the French had fought
against previously and their underestimation in conjunction with sincere
misunderstanding led to military mistakes. Initially the sentiments of the FLN were not
shared throughout the entire Algerian Muslim population. It was not through the power of
persuasion that the Muslims came to side with and aid the FLN, but rather scare tactics.
FLN members would extort food and funds from the civilians and use “acts of terror to
intimidate the inhabitants into silence”, including the mutilation of French loyalist and
the elimination of Muslim moderates (Millen 2008, 29). This did not go unnoticed by the
French and throughout his trips, Jacques Soustelle observed that “the FLN ‘never sought
to attach the rural populations to their cause by promising them a better life, a happier
and freer future; no, it was through terror that they submitted to their tyranny’” (Millen
2008, 29). This practice was started from the onset of fighting and continued throughout
the entire war.
Although the majority, approximately eighty-six percent, of the FLN was Muslim
the organization showed no difference in its policy towards a moderate or pro-French
Muslim and the actual colonists; in its eyes an enemy was an enemy and its treatment
towards them was unforgiving. In many cases the final initiation requirement to join the
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FLN was the assassination of a government official or informant. The mutilation of
French loyalists, both Muslim and colon, was also a common practice that served to
belittle the enemy (Millen 2008, 29). This served as a scare tactic which forced other
Muslims to support the FLN cause.
At the start of the conflict there were Muslims who were more moderate in nature
and were willing to meet and negotiate with the French. One of the first acts of the FLN
was to eliminate these Muslim moderates because it did not want “any moderate
interlocutors available for the French to negotiate peace” (Millen 2008, 29). At the end of
the war it was estimated that almost sixty-nine thousand Muslims were killed by the ALN
and that many of these losses were a result of internal purges (Stora 2001, 110). The few
moderates who remained joined the FLN after a few years due to their shock at the
extreme nature of the French response. In addition to removing the moderate Muslims,
the FLN strategically planned its attacks with the intention of severing European contact
with the Muslim population (Millen 2008, 29). The French no longer communicated to
and trusted the Muslim population, unable to be sure which individuals were members of
the FLN, and in turn, the Algerians no longer had faith in the French since the military
responded with such harsh, collective reprisals. These tactics were extremely effective
and caused huge setbacks for the French. They were shocked at the success and number
of the attacks by the FLN and as a result they disarmed many citizens for fear that the
weapons would be given to the militants. This plan backfired and left the general
population defenseless against the FLN; with no other option many soon aided the
militant organization.
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The Change from a “Phony War” to a Full Conflict, Philippeville 1955
After several months of conflict it appeared that the strength of the FLN was
beginning to wane under the continuous military strikes by the French. The leaders of the
Constantinois region felt that the Algerian population needed a boost in spirits and that
the revolution needed momentum. They decided that, “collective reprisals against
Europeans, military or civilian, should be used as a reply to the colonial policy of
collective response” (Hutchinson 1978, 50). The FLN adopted this policy in August 1955
and in essence “raised the level of the conflict” by broadening the scope of their attacks
to include civilians (Millen 2008, 29). Until the clash at Philippeville, the FLN had
performed “ambushes and night raids” on army patrols, military encampments, police
posts, and transportation and communications facilities (Metz 1994, 48); rarely, if ever,
did it attack European civilians.
On August 20, 1955, thousands of Algerian peasants revolted in over thirty
villages within the four main cities of Collo, Philippeville, Constantine, and Guelma. The
initial intention of the events was to mark “the second anniversary of the deposing of Sidi
Mohammed Ben Youcef, sultan of Morocco, by the French” (Stora 2001, 43). At first the
attacks focused mostly on police stations, the military, and various government buildings,
yet soon the thousands of peasants and agricultural workers began performing acts of
violence against citizens. Many “French people, but also Muslims, were murdered with
axes, billhooks, picks, or knives” and various political figures were attacked (Millen
2001, 43). This escalation of violence resulted in the deaths of one hundred and twenty
three people, seventy-one of whom were European. After this event the French would
severely increase their tactics for defeating the FLN.
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The French response was immediate, collective, and extremely violent. Soustelle
declared a state of emergency and the French government “ceded its political authority to
the military leadership in Algeria” as a way of ending the insurgency by any means
(Millen 2008, 30). The weakening of political direction and constraints on military
strategy “virtually undercut any political settlement of the insurgency” (Millen 2008, 30).
France sent sixty thousand reservists to Algeria and private militias were formed; and,
rather than solely attacking the FLN, the French continued to enact a policy of collective
responsibility. In the end the official death toll was 1,273 although the FLN claims that
the actual figure was 12,000 persons who were missing or dead in the following weeks
(Hutchinson 1978, 51). Overnight the war changed from a mild conflict to a severe battle.
The initial goal of the Philippeville attacks, which was to incite a massive
Algerian uprising, failed to transpire yet overall the results were successful. The actions
of August 1955 were considered “a major event which led many hesitant Muslims to opt
for the FLN” (Hutchinson 1978, 51). Those few moderate Muslims who had not been
removed in the first months of the war now viewed the FLN as a serious organization that
was “representative of a Muslim population, which now aspired to independence rather
than assimilation or integration” (Hutchinson 1978, 51). Moderate Muslims renounced
negotiations and joined the FLN in favor of full confrontation (MSN Encarta, “Algerian
War of Independence, 2008). The possibility for negotiations was no longer seemed like
a viable or popular option by either side.
Changes in French Government and Military Tactics Following Philippeville
The actions of the FLN at Philippeville resulted in changes in the French
government. Four days after the initial attack in August 1955, sixty thousand soldiers
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who had recently been released from duty were recalled to service in Algeria and on
August 30 “the government decreed that 180,000 dischargeable soldiers would remain in
the military” (Stora 2001, 44). Instantly the soldiers and their families began protests
across France and although they claimed to have the encouragement of the French
civilians, the lack of actual support caused the protests to be short lived. During this time
individuals as well as major organizations and political parties were more “preoccupied
with the tumult of political life within France” and with good reason (Stora 2001, 45). On
November 29 the Assembly passed a no-confidence vote on the current French
government, resulting in its dissolution. This vote, with a margin of 318 to 218, was not
directly linked to Philippeville but rather a number of issues that were plaguing France at
the time.
Within Algeria during this time there was also an uprooting of the current
government. The government decided to postpone elections until there was a more stable
situation. It was also during this time that the elected officials in Ferhat Abbas’ Union
Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien, one of the few moderate organizations to survive
the FLN’s purge, resigned from the Algerian assembly. This was following in the
footsteps of the sixty-one Muslim officials who had already left in opposition to
Soustelle.
The French elections were held on January 2, 1956 and the Front Républicain, a
new party formed by Socialists and Radicals, surprisingly won fifty-two out of six
hundred and twenty-three seats. The Communists also won fifty seats; the landscape of
the French government was beginning to change. On February 1, Guy Mollet, a French
Socialist of the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière Party, became the Premier

41

under the new government. The next day Jacques Soustelle, who had arrived in Algeria
as a relatively unpopular Premier, left the country as thousands of Europeans
demonstrated their affection. A few days later, Mollet arrived with a neutral policy and a
desire to find peaceful negotiations. He was met with a demonstration by supporters of a
French Algeria and five days later “abandoned his policy” of peace (Stora 2001, 46).
Soon after Pierre Mendes-France, an individual who was against colonialism, resigned
his post as State Minister; this new Socialist-led government would lead France into a
fully-fledged war.
The colon extremists and military personnel viewed this new government as an
opportunity to increase French manpower in Algeria, which was already totaling 190,000
soldiers by that time. Robert Lacoste was quickly appointed Minister Resident in Algeria
and introduced a bill in the National Assembly “authorizing the government to set in
place a program of economic expansion, social progress, and administrative reform in
Algeria, and enabling it to take all exceptional measures in view of reestablishing order,
protecting persons and property, and safeguarding the territory” (Stora 2001, 46). What
followed were decrees that allowed the increase of military action and the recall of
reservists as well as a law which established special powers that suspended most of the
guarantees of individual liberties in Algeria; by stripping individuals of their civil
liberties, a total and complete war could now be fought without effect on one’s
conscience.
With the recall of reservists, tens of thousands of soldiers made their way into
Algeria; this allowed the French to change their strategy vis-à-vis to the FLN. Algeria
was divided into three different sections: a zone of operation, a pacification zone, and a
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forbidden zone (Stora 2001, 46). Each zone had a specific army corps and goal: the
forces of the operation zone were meant to destroy the rebels; the soldiers within the
pacification zone oversaw the protection of the European and Muslim populations; and
the forbidden zones were evacuated, with their populations being sent to camps that were
run by the army. Although this strategy of concentrating the troops was effective overall,
it took time for these new troops to become accustomed to the harsh terrain and
unconventional battle tactics.
The Introduction of “Revolutionary Terrorism” by the FLN
The FLN did have two alternatives during this time and could have either “sought
the tolerance of at least some part of the European population or treated Europeans as a
monolithic enemy and concentrated on gaining Algerian approval” (Hutchinson 1978,
53). The unwillingness of the FLN to accept anything less than total independence made
the latter the only viable option. Events of late 1955 and early 1956, including the French
capture of Ben Bella, an increase in European violence against Algerians, and continued
military repression, created a situation where the FLN would have been unable to win
European neutrality even if the Muslim population had desired it (Hutchinson 1978, 53).
The FLN had already been organizing events of compliance terrorism (terrorism directed
at Muslims to obtain compliance) as well as isolation terrorism (terrorism meant to
isolate Muslim and European communities) and organizational terrorism (terrorism
directed at Muslims to strengthen the FLN) (Prochaska 1980, 132). With the subsequent
events of Philippeville and the increase in French violence, the party now implemented a
policy of endorsement terrorism, a variety of terrorism designed to target the Europeans
with the hope of gaining the support of the Muslims (Prochaska 1980, 132). This new
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type of endorsement terrorism continued to strengthen the position of the FLN within
Algeria and proved to be multifunctional; it directed Algerians to side with the FLN
cause, created insecurity among colonists, and weakened the French government.
This new policy of actions frequently led to indiscriminate and violent French
reactions. The FLN was getting closer to its overall goal, which was to force the French
to react in a more brutal manner and subsequently convincing more Muslims to support
the FLN, regardless of whether the reaction from their plans came from the military or
the European civilians. With these violent responses came a greater polarization between
the European and the Muslim populations and the furthering of Algerian support for selfdetermination. With their increasing isolation, the French became more insecure and this
“fear and anger was expressed in hostility and irrational violence towards Algerians”,
creating a continuous chain that resulted in an increased support for the FLN (Hutchinson
1978, 54). The fear that existed among the French colonial population would result in
serious consequences near the end of the war.
Total War in Algeria, 1956
On March 16, 1956, only four days after the special powers vote that stripped
Algerians of their liberties, Algiers suffered attacks from the FLN. Lacoste immediately
imposed a curfew on the city and increased France’s military presence there. As the year
continued “terrorism took root nearly everywhere” and initially the French suffered many
casualties as they put their plan of the quadrillage system, a method of dividing a counterinsurgency terrain into sections as a means of isolating the people within while searching
the enclosed area for insurgents, into action (Stora 2001, 47). Although the early failures
caused the French public to become “acutely aware of the war in Algeria”, the French
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response became increasingly successful and inflicted 13,899 casualties on the FLN over
the span of nine months (Millen 2008, 31).
Throughout the year there were many terrorist attacks which were spearheaded by
the FLN and resulted in counter-terrorist attacks by the French. Examples of this can be
found in the French decision to begin executing the captured FLN prisoners in June and
the decision for troops in August to bomb a house in the Algiers Casbah, resulting in at
least seventy Algerian casualties (Hutchinson 1978, 57). The French response of
counterterrorism to the FLN attacks created a situation where “the terrorist commandos
were practically forced to act to satisfy popular calls for vengeance”, the goal of
endorsement terrorism, even though the French tried to defend itself, insisting that the
FLN struck first with its bomb attacks (Hutchinson 1978, 57). The FLN responded with
an attack where two time bombs were placed in two restaurants in the European center of
Algiers; the explosions left two dead and sixty injured (Hutchinson 1978, 57). The
Algerians expressed a general enthusiasm for these actions and were “offended by
European indifference to counterterrorism and outraged by the execution of prisoners”
(Hutchinson 1978, 57). The cycle of violence, particularly in Algiers, would always be
justified as an act of retaliation, resulting in an inevitable cyclical effect where neither
party acknowledged its own responsibilities.
The relatively successful operations of the French could have possibly been
enough to end the war in victory, yet as the year came to an end the focus became
diverted to the Suez War and the annihilation of Nasser. The FLN took full “advantage of
these events to make its presence known in the countryside and in the cities” (Stora 2001,
48). They took the repressive actions of the French army and used them to recruit
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thousands of young Algerians toward their guerilla forces; by the end of 1956 the ALN
had “tens of thousands of warriors in its ranks” (Stora 2001, 48). Guy Mollet appointed
General Raoul Salan as the new Commander-in-Chief of the Algerian forces; a veteran of
Indochina, his leadership would cause France to enter a new phase in the Algerian War.
A Further Increase in Violent Tactics, The Battle of Algiers, 1957
On December 27, 1956 Amédée Froger, the President of the Association of
European Mayors and an unofficial spokesman for the colons, was murdered in Algiers.
The following day at his funeral, there was a massive outbreak of violence against the
Arab population, which the French police failed to control due to their sympathy with the
colons’ cause. Tensions between the colons and the Muslims were at an all-time high and
the Algerian general government decided to act. Due to the “special powers” law that had
been passed in March 1956, Lacoste was able to “entrust the pacification of Algiers to the
Commander of the Tenth Paratroopers’ Division” (Stora 2001, 49). On January 7, 1957
eight thousand paratroopers occupied the city and the “Battle of Algiers” began.
The violence was immediate and widespread within the city and the practice of
torture and excess was committed by both parties. During this time the ALN carried out
an average of 800 shootings and bombings per month (Metz 1994, 49). In theory one can
differentiate between provocation terrorism and vengeance terrorism, yet with the Battle
of Algiers it was sometimes difficult to separate the two, in either the case of the French
or of the FLN. An example can be found in an event with the following FLN explanation:
January 22, 1957, the Algiers-Kolea bus was attacked, at 6:30 pm, by a
group of the ALN. The European passengers were executed. After the
burial of one of them, a sergeant living at Fouka, the racist militia of that
locality kidnapped and killed six Algerians… Why did the ALN conduct
this daring raid and proceed to these executions? The reason is simple.
Kolea is the seat of a military school and a battalion of paratroopers.
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Before the attack on the bus…a grenade was thrown on a paratrooper
patrol. During the night they descended to the Arab town ‘after a loss of
control’. Led by the territorials, they forced their way into houses that they
pillaged before ‘cleaning them out’ with grenades or knives. The number
of victims, including several women, is almost sixty. Sixteen girls were
raped (Hutchinson 1978, 59).
Another example can be found in May 1957 when FLN terrorists killed two paratroopers;
in response the French army killed or wounded eighty Algerians (Hutchinson 1978, 56).
Uncontrolled reprisals “against the Algerian population were almost as common in the
army as they were in the European civilian population” (Hutchinson 1978, 56). An
example can be found on January 26 when two charges exploded in the bar L’Otomatic
and the café Le Coq Hardi; two Muslim Algerians were lynched by a European mob in
response (Stora 2001, 49). In June 1957 an FLN bombing of the Casino de la Corniche
killed eight and wounded forty-five. In reply, six Algerians were killed and forty five
were wounded in addition to the twenty cars that were burned and the hundred Algerian
stores that were pillaged (Hutchinson 1978, 55). The severity of the colon and military
action caused problems for France both within its domestic population and the
international arena.
The events in Algeria caught the attention of the international community after
two years of violence. There were many countries, especially those with a history of
colonizing other nations, which accepted the French position but not their specific
policies. Others, such as Tunisia and Morocco, were providing the FLN with weapons
and reinforcements. The “Algerian Question” was placed on the agenda for the United
Nations General Assembly sessions in January 1957. In preparation, the FLN sent
delegations to Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the United States, China, India, and
Latin America.
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Prior to the UN conference, Britain and the United States, “wanted the French to
accept a more innocuous resolution on Algeria rather than a confrontational approach”
(Alexander 2002, 167). Mollet responded to this request by saying that he could not “go
any further towards independence without provoking a revolution in Algiers, which
would be backed by a considerable portion of the French Army” (Alexander 2002, 168).
The powers that were given to the colon population in France now restricted the actions
of the French government and risked the international alienation of France; this would
foreshadow the events of the Generals’ Putsch, which came later in the war.
On January 28, 1957, with the hopes of influencing the United Nations debate on
the “Algerian Question”, the FLN organized an eight-day strike in Algiers in which many
workers and businesses participated. Although General Massu used the paratroopers to
break the strike and systematically destroy the FLN infrastructure in Algiers, the event
showed that the FLN had the capability to rally a mass response and exemplified its
appeal among the Muslim population.
After the strike the city was divided into sections and “the Muslim neighborhoods
were isolated behind barbed wire, under searchlights” (Stora 2001, 49). Massu’s men
made “massive arrests, systematically took down names, and in ‘transit and sorting
centers’, located on the periphery of the city, practiced torture” (Stora 2001, 50). The
French released stories of FLN leadership mysteriously “committing suicide” after
undergoing interrogations. Despite their questionable morality, the methods of using
electrodes, dunking suspects in bathtubs, and severely beating them were effective and
the FLN’s sub-organization in Algiers, the ZAA, was destroyed while attacks were
reduced by nearly seventy-five percent in less than two months.
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The French military’s means of obtaining information and results were not
popular with many of the soldiers who were forced to enact them. For many of them, they
would live with those “nightmares for the rest of their lives” (Stora 201, 50). On March
28, 1957 General Paris de Bollardière asked to be relieved of his duties in Algeria
because he simply could not endorse torture after his experiences with the Nazis the
previous decade. Massu’s Paratrooper’s Division responded by declaring, “One cannot
fight against revolutionary war except with methods of clandestine action” (Stora 2001,
50). Paul Teitgen, the Secretary General of the Algiers police, resigned and spoke out
against the practices of General Massu; he claimed that 3,024 individuals had
disappeared during the Battle of Algiers (Stora 2001, 50). Despite these horrible
practices, the paratroopers had the support of the colon population and Yacef Saadi,
leader of the ZAA, was arrested at the end of September while his assistant committed
suicide; the Battle of Algiers had finally come to an end.
The War amongst the Algerian Muslim Population and the Expansion of the FLN
It is important to pause for a moment and discuss the internal war that was
occurring between Algerian political factions during this time. With the start of the
Algerian War on November 1, 1954 there was no single structure or leadership within the
organization of the FLN. On November 4, 1954 the Council of Ministers disbanded the
Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD) which was headed by
Messali Hadj and was meant to replace the Parti du Peuple Algerien (PPA). Several
hundred nationalist leaders were arrested and those who were not, were forced to hide
underground or join the guerilla forces. The FLN intended to benefit from the MTLD’s
dissolution and established “structures to intercept the majority of disoriented Messalists”
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as well as take ownership of the weapons that they possessed and their connections
abroad (Stora 2001, 57). Messali Hadj was adamantly against the start of the Algerian
War and established the MNA or Mouvement National Algérien which was the only
socialist faction to not eventually join the FLN’s cause.
There was a very clear differentiation between the “activists”, who formed the
FLN, and the “Messalists”, who became members of the MNA, resulting in a struggle to
gain the support of the “centralists”, which would lead the two organizations to violent
confrontation in late 1955. During the first year of the war against the French, the FLN
printed an assortment of propaganda directed at the MNA. The leader of the FLN in
Algiers printed a pamphlet in which he referred to Messali Hadj as a “shame-faced old
man who holds the Angoulême front, at the head of an army of police officers, which
assures his protection against the anger of the people” (Stora 2001, 59). On December 10,
after a year of passive verbal exchanges and propaganda, two FLN militants executed
Sadek Rihani, the leader of the MNA in Algiers. For the rest of the war there existed an
internal civil war that unfolded in both France and Algeria. The “‘shock commandos’ of
the FLN and MNA waged a long, cruel battle using every means possible: traps, betrayal,
infiltration, and executions to serve as an example, all of them sowing fear” (Stora 2001,
59). The especially brutal of actions of the FLN caused MNA supporters to turn and join
the French forces. By the end of 1962, it was would be predicted that within France, the
nationalist conflict would result in four thousand deaths, twelve thousand assaults, and
over nine thousand injuries; the numbers within Algeria would be larger, with six
thousand dead and over fourteen thousand wounded (Stora 2001, 59). The FLN would
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emerge triumphant but at the expense of ten thousand dead civilians and a lack of a more
moderate voice in Algeria’s post-war government.
During the first two years of the war, the FLN reached out and increased
discussions with other divisions of the pro-independence movement yet despite these
efforts, it expected the other parties to simply disband and their members to join its cause.
Many of the centralists slowly joined the FLN, including Ferhat Abbas’ UDMA, which
joined forces with the FLN after the Philippeville massacre. The FLN was able to obtain
such support through the approval of the religious ulama, which “glorified the resistance
to colonialism” (Stora 2001, 60). Even the Algerian Communists were incorporated into
the FLN on July 1, 1956 (Stora 2001, 60). The unification of the political organizations
naturally led to a strengthening of public support for complete independence.
The Soummam Congress, which was held on August 20, 1956, made official the
dissolution of all other parties, including the ulama and UDMA. The twenty-day
conference was based on the “assertion of the civil over the political… Its intention was
to endow the FLN with formal structures and a clear chain of political command” (Evans
2007, 64). The Congress formed a thirty-four member Conseil National de la Révolution
Algérienne, which was to be the ruling body of the FLN and serve as a sort of
parliamentary skeleton. This structure of collective leadership placed an emphasis on
domestic issues. The sixteen men that congregated also gave a full assessment of their
material capabilities and plans were formed to strengthen weapons supply operations.
This led to a complete overhaul of the ALN, with the restructuring of Algerian territories
and the formation of a regular army, including a very fixed hierarchy. This meeting was
the only of its kind but it laid the groundwork for the future government of Algeria.
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The Disintegration of the Fourth Republic of France and the Continuation of War
Entering the third year of the conflict, France was faced with a growing number
of problems, including a deteriorating relationship with other nations as well as the colon
population. A number of foreign countries, including the United Kingdom and the United
States, had begun to aid the FLN by providing Tunisia with weapons and funds. The
French government also considered shortening the length of military service during this
time because of its immense confidence in programs such as the electric barrier, known
as the Morice Line. This electrified, barbed-wire fence spanned over one hundred and
fifty miles across the Algerian-Tunisia border and was meant to prevent Tunisia guerillas
from entering the colony. Any break in the wires was instantly registered on control
panels in French military posts and brought detachments of troops to the area. Although
these measures were extremely effective, it isolated Algeria, angering many of the
colons. On March 13, police officers violently protested in Paris and a month later
individuals who were beginning to crack under the pressures of the UN were voted out of
the government (Stora 2001, 70). The fall of the franc, the lack of power in the
administration, and the foreign trade deficit only added to the problems facing the
government.
There was speculation for months regarding what or who was needed to restore
France back to its prior greatness. One name that became increasingly popular was
General Charles de Gaulle. A veteran of both World Wars, de Gaulle was Prime Minister
of France’s Provisional Government in 1944 and he retired two years later following
political conflicts. To “the army and settlers he presented himself as the man to save
Algeria, while to the public at large he cast himself as the only bulwark against a military
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takeover” (Evans 2007, 61). He had wonderful political instincts and although many
people supported his candidacy, General de Gaulle waited to take control in an attempt to
establish a new French government with increased presidential powers. After nearly a
month of protests, killings, and threats within Algeria, the situation had become out of
control and Robert Lacoste was called to Paris. A huge riot in Algiers trapped the French
leadership and forced them to “facilitate General de Gaulle’s accession to power”; two
days later the General announced that he was “ready to assume the powers of the
Republic” (Stora 2001, 71). On May 26 the premier was convinced to resign and General
de Gaulle’s investiture by the assembly occurred on June 1 (Metz 1994, 52). Three days
later he traveled to Algeria where he declared, “I have understood you” (Metz 1994, 52).
He proposed measures to improve the economic, social, and political status of the
Muslims but at the same time gave hope to the colons and military for a future of
assimilation. Very quickly he put forth a distinct plan and wanted to bring together both
the Muslims and the Europeans; interestingly, he “banished from his speeches the
expressions ‘French Algeria’ and ‘integration’” (Stora 2001, 73). On September 28, 1958
both Europeans and Muslim men and women voted in favor of the constitution of the
Fifth Republic. During this time de Gaulle promised fifteen billion francs for public
works and urban development in Algeria as well as a new plan for Muslim education. He
was voted the first President of the Fifth Republic on December 21, 1958. The actions of
General de Gaulle throughout the year, including offering pardons for the convicts in the
FLN, caused concern amongst the pied noir, or colons, population.
By the middle of the 1959, after serious pressures from the international
community and tremendous losses for the French, General de Gaulle declared that self-
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determination must be the course that France pursues in the war. This came after the
President began the year by ordering the army to perform the “harshest blows against the
FLN” (Stora 2001, 75). The French started to once again make military progress and
killed many of the higher level officials within the FLN framework. They also placed
many Algerians in internment camps; by the end of the war nearly two million people
had been displaced (Stora 2001, 75). Although de Gaulle initially gained much support
from the colon and military populations, he understood that they were a large “part of
rather than the solution to the insurgency problem” (Millen 2008, 33). He used the
military push to create a situation where the French would have a favorable position in
negotiation talks and did so by reducing the ALN troops in half by the end of the year
(Millen 2008, 33). The President had created a situation where he was able to offer
Algeria a moderate government with close ties to France but he did not anticipate the
response from the European population.
The Colon and Military Response to Self-Determination
As the possibility of independence became clearer, Europeans began to fear for
their future. The colons were outnumbered nine to one by the Muslim population and
they knew that their lives in Algeria were finished once France pulled out their troops;
they began to experience a “great panic” (Stora 2001, 77). On January 24, 1960 the colon
activists, who were fearful that the French policy was beginning to waver, clashed with
the gendarmes. These activists set up an entrenched camp in the name of French Algeria
and called on the army and European community to support them (Stora 2001, 77).
Although the rioters surrendered in the beginning of February, there had been suspicious
activity by some officials within the French military against the French government. This

54

event, which would come to be known as “Barricades Week”, exposed some wavering
within the command and military.
By the spring of 1960 the French army believed that it had won the war and on
June 25 the FLN and the French government opened their first set of negotiations.
Although nothing resulted from these talks, they brought an enormous hope to France for
“peace and the return of the contingent” (Stora 2001, 79). Pressure grew from the
international community, with Algerian leaders traveling across the world to garner the
support of the UN. France’s African allies called for the country to recognize the nation’s
right to self-determination as well. Even within France, people were uneasy with the
prospect of forcing their imperialist views against the citizens’ free-will. Fifty-three youth
movements in France came together and set forth a common position of wishing to see
the war end. Other political organizations in France also banded together and signed a
declaration wishing to see the start of negotiations. People were coming to the realization
that there was no longer a possibility of re-establishing a pre-war Algeria.
The FLN was able to recover “through politics and diplomacy all the ground lost
by the use of force” and on January 8, 1961, President de Gaulle submitted his policy of
self determination to a referendum vote which passed overwhelmingly; negotiations were
set to open on April 7 in Evian (Stora 2001, 77). It was at this time that General Salan,
who had been banished from Algeria, organized the Organisation Armée Secrete, or
OAS, to perform a counterrevolution led by the army and colons. General Maurice
Challe, who had been transferred after suspicious activity during Barricades Week,
secretly arrived in Algiers, along with Salan and two other generals, to launch a coup
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d’état. The army had promised a French Algeria and it refused to give in to the country’s
desire for self-determination.
On April 21, 1961, the Green Berets, or special forces of the French Navy,
“marched on Algiers and seized the general government, the airfield, the city hall, and the
weapons depot” (Stora 2001, 80). Within three hours the city had fallen and the French
government declared a state of emergency. Because it lacked the overall support of the
army, the French President understood that the putsch would be failure and called for
resistance by soldiers against their officers. Five days after first taking the city, Maurice
Challe surrendered and the putsch collapsed; the OAS however, continued to thrive.
After the putsch General Salan went underground and gained supreme command
of the OAS, an organization with the objective of resisting Algerian disengagement and
constructing a new “fraternal and French Algeria” (Stora 2001, 82). With the start of
negotiations in Evian on May 20, the OAS adopted a policy of terrorism, attacking
Muslims and government employees to create a barrier within negotiations. The
organization began to gain support amongst the colon population and created a cohesive
policy in the fall 1961 with the colons’ participation. The OAS even gained some support
within the National Assembly. It organized massive demonstrations and General Salan
claimed that he would be able to have an army of 100,000 men for the start of the
following year. Yet, an increase in OAS actions resulted in an increase in repression by
both the police networks and the FLN, with a severe increase in violence.
OAS actions became bolder as the prospect of negotiations became a clearer
reality. Its members would be disguised as gendarmes, get prisoners released to them, and
then execute them a few minutes later. They murdered six leaders within the academic
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realm, including Mouloud Feraoun, a writer and friend of Albert Camus, another famous
Algerian-born French author. The members also resorted to bazooka attacks on the
barracks of the gendarmes and booby-trapped cars in Muslim neighborhoods. Fear
became something that people of Algiers lived with, yet the OAS did not succeed to
halting the pro-independence movement.
The Evian Accords and Algerian Independence
After eight years of intense fighting, a cease-fire was signed on March 19, 1962
and people in both Algeria and France rejoiced. Negotiators for the FLN made
a few concessions regarding the rights of Europeans (dual nationality for
three years, then the option of Algerian nationality or the status of
privileged resident alien), control of the Sahara (preferential rights for
French companies in the distribution of research and exploitation permits
for six years, payment for Algerian fossil fuels in French francs), and the
military bases (Mers el-Kebir was to remain French for a period of fifteen
years and the installations in the Sahara for five years) (Stora 2001, 98).
The French in return offered economic and financial aid to the Algerians, including sixtytwo thousand acres of land for Muslim farmers, the construction of housing for one
million people, regular employment for four thousand new workers, schooling for all
Algerian children within three years, and salaries and benefits equal to those in the
metropolis (Stora 2001, 98). The agreement also took into account the French citizens
within Algeria and required that their property rights be respected and that they have a
fair and equal role in the government.
Despite this reassurance, OAS attacks continued and in fact became even more
violent. During the month of May, “ten to fifty Algerians in Oran were slaughtered by the
OAS on a daily basis” (Stora 2001, 100). Europeans were fleeing the cities (ten thousand
left in May) and the FLN leaders were finding it “increasingly difficult to hold back an
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exasperated Muslim population who wanted to strike back” (Stora 2001, 100). Many of
the original leaders including Salan were arrested and the OAS understood that its fight
was over and yet it refused to leave without incident. It continued to enact its policy of
“scorched-earth”; finally at the end of June, after setting the city of Oran on fire, the
remaining members of the OAS went into exile while thousands of Europeans continued
to leave the country.
On July 1, 1962, six million voters in Algeria declared that they wanted to
become an independent state within the guidelines of the Evian Accords; only 16,534
voted no. After seven years of bloodshed, the Algerians rejoiced in their new-found
autonomy yet there were still final purges and violent acts occurring within the country.
Four days after the vote, a massive Muslim mob entered the European city of Oran and
proceeded to hunt for anyone who remained. In the end, ninety-five people were killed,
twenty of whom were European, and one hundred and sixty-one were wounded. In the
end 3,080 people were abducted, of which 257 were killed (Stora 2001, 106). This was
the last battle within French Algeria, yet another battle, one for control, was about to
ensue in the country.
The Consequences of War
The war of Algerian liberty cost both France and its former colony severe
economic and social setbacks. It is difficult to make an accurate calculation of the
financial costs but it has been estimated that solely during the war, France lost twentyseven to fifty billion francs, or ten to eighteen percent of its GDP (Stora 2001, 107). The
various reparations were an addition seven billion and these totals do not include the
income lost by their loss of income from Algeria. There has also been a discrepancy with
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the total number of casualties on both sides. In 1962, the FLN estimated that nearly three
hundred thousand people were dead from war-related causes although “Algerian sources
later put that figure at approximately 1.5 million, while French officials estimated it at
350,000” (Metz 1994, 55). Another estimated sixty-nine thousand Muslims were killed
by the ALN due to internal purges (Stora 2001, 110). The French never formally released
their losses but it is estimated that nearly twelve thousand citizens perished. These
numbers do not include the massacre of the harkis, Muslims who aided the French, the
Europeans, or the losses during the clashes for power after 1962. The total human loss of
the war and its aftermath will never truly be known.
The Less Immediate Results of the War for Independence
There were many aspects of the war that had residual consequences; one of these
was the questioning and use of torture. The French army’s “use of torture has been the
focus of public controversy since the war years, and the horrific details that emerged
from survivors’ accounts later became inescapable reference points for an entire
generation in France” (Hargreaves 2005, 126). At the time the use of torture, rape, and
resettlement were given the names of social, police, or psychological operations but the
leaders of the FLN reached out to the international community and exposed the French
acts for what they were, making France a subject of global controversy. Stories of
atrocities have come forth and have been verified by key military players in the conflict,
including General Massu, who controlled the Paratroopers of Algiers. This completely
shattered the romantic image that many French citizens had of the conflict and caused
them to resent the amnesty laws that were passed throughout the next thirty years.
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Another lingering issue was that of the Algerian immigration to France during the
years of the war; the number had doubled during that period. Most “of the immigrants
were men” between the ages of twenty and forty who had been displaced due to French
military policy (Stora 2001, 63). During this time nearly one million men of working age
were unemployed in Algeria and France was in serious need of workers to replace the
men who had been sent to fight (Stora 2001, 64). This would later become a problem
when the immigration laws within France would tighten and people were only able to
move to the country through family reunification. Even today, the issue of immigration,
especially of peoples from North African countries, plagues French politics.
The Evian Accords assured that the new Algerian government maintained close
ties with France; the intertwining of interests, despite very distinct differences, has led to
the continuation of a tense relationship. Algeria continues to celebrate its independence
from France yet the European nation chose to have a collective memory of denial; it did
not publicly acknowledge that a war was fought until 1999. For the Algerians, the war for
their independence justified the use of violence to obtain political success and reinforce
the ideology of the FLN. Thirty years later, this theory would be used to validate the
actions of the organization with their struggle to maintain their position in government
against the FIS.
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Chapter 3: The Algerian Civil War
Twenty-five years after achieving independence from France, Algeria was almost
unrecognizable, having undergone radical changes in its economic, societal, and cultural
foundation. From the ashes of the war arose a fairly stable, single party system which was
“legitimized by the conquest of national independence and grounded in the key
institutions of the nationalist struggle, the party, and the army” (Mortimer, 1996, 18).
With a new-found freedom and government, what was once a rather rural nation now had
iron and steel complexes, oil refineries, fertilizer factories, and natural gas liquification
plants. By the end of the 1970’s, the country was “one vast construction site where
everywhere roads, factories, and schools were being built” (Martinez 2000, 2). Algeria
began to invest heavily in education and health care, leading to a drop in infant mortality
and a significant increase in the population (Pierre 1995, 134). Young Algerians,
including women, were given increased accessibility to an education. The number of
wage-earning jobs had increased dramatically, making the shift from 700,000 in 1963 to
2,300,000 in 1981; to fill these positions, people began moving to urban centers (Stora
2001, 193). These positive changes in Algerian society were relatively immediate; yet in
the late 1970s and 1980s, the flaws in the government’s programs began to show.
Although the Algerian regime was able to maintain a relatively stable position for
over a decade, its projects of industrialization and national improvements were
overambitious; problems began to wear down the single party establishment. Beginning
in the 1970s and into the 1980s three crises simultaneously faced the nation, the most
obvious beginning economic (Pierre 1995, 132). The sudden increase in population and
urbanization rates produced a housing crisis where “one million housing units would
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have had to be built within ten years merely to reduce the scarcity to its 1973 level”
(Stora 2001, 193). At this time there was an inadequacy of hydraulic equipment which
led to water rationing in most large cities. The Algerian regime had made vast changes to
improve the health of its citizens but it had not prepared properly for the inevitable result
of an increased population.
In the late 1970s the number of unemployed began to increase and affect the
younger generations of Algerians. In 1985, “nearly seventy-two percent of those looking
for work were under twenty-five” and this segment of the population was a direct product
of the “Arabized” education that the regime had tried to put forth since gaining power
(Stora 2001, 193). The youths that were now looking for work in Algeria were of the first
generation completely educated in the independent nation and they were barely literate in
either Arabic or French (Pierre 1995, 134). This population of youths, unacquainted with
the war against the French, began to become disenchanted with the regime under
President Chadli Benjedid. Up until this point, the FLN’s power rested on a legitimacy
which was founded in the idea that the political party had obtained Algeria its
independence from the French. They relied on war-time stories and depended on the
older generations to instill this respect in the younger populations of the nation. When
this failed to transpire, the administration’s war-time rhetoric was no longer effective and
therefore its legitimacy came into question.
To implement these sudden changes in infrastructure and society, Algeria took out
billions of dollars worth of loans with high interest rates. The country’s economy was
dependent upon oil and gas revenues, and fossil fuels represented nearly a third of the
nation’s GDP at the end of the 1970s (Stora 2001, 186). The leaders of the government
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depended upon the increasing revenues from this sector to repay their loans, a plan which
backfired when oil prices tumbled in the 1980s. For a period of time oil revenues were
large enough to allow “a boom in consumer goods” and a private sector emerged, as did a
large gap between the rich and poor classes (Pierre 1995, 134). This gap led to further
embitterment when the oil market plummeted. There was a lack of consumer goods and a
scarcity in hard currency as a result. Citizens had to suffer shortages of cooking oil,
coffee, and tea; “women waited in long lines for scare and expensive food while young
men milled in frustration on street corners unable to find work” (Metz 1994, 62). The
economic and socio-cultural crises were about to combine and create an explosive
political crisis.
During this time of economic disaster, Islamists were able to increase their
influence over a population who felt that their government had been unable to fulfill its
economic promises. In the late 1970s, “Muslim activists engaged in isolated and
relatively small-scale assertions of their will: harassing women whom they felt were
dressed inappropriately, smashing establishments that served alcohol, and evicting
official imams from their mosques” (Metz 1994, 62). The Islamists increased their
activism and called for the dissolution of the National Charter and the formation of an
Islamic government in 1982.
Islam had always been a unifying force in Algeria and had played a role in the
decisions of past leaders of the nation; Ben Bella banned the marketing of alcohol,
Boumedienne chose Friday, the day of prayer, as the new weekend day, and Benjedid
promoted the 1984 Family Code, which deprived women of the freedom to act on their
own by making them wards of their family prior to marriage and accountable to their
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husbands after marriage (Tahi 1995, 214). It was in the same year, 1984, that the
government turned to religious leaders to “attest that its regime was essentially in
conformity with Islam” and in return built one of the largest Islamic universities in the
world amidst economic strife (Tahi, 1995, 214). The concessions that the government
presented to the Islamists did not improve the status of its economy which was directly
linked to the country’s social issues. Political Islam, “just like any other extremist
ideology, nourishes itself essentially on poverty and hopelessness. Economic insecurity
breeds fear, and fear breeds intolerance and violence in Algeria” (Tahi, 1995, 214). The
single-party regime no longer held popular favor amongst its citizens and saw Islamists
as a potential threat to its monopoly on power.
Economic Reforms under Bendjedid
Algeria’s third President, Chadli Bendjedid, came into power in 1979 and adopted
a guideline of distancing himself from the economic policies of his predecessor, Houari
Boumedienne. Under his plan,
basic industries were accused of monopolizing investment capital to the detriment
of other sectors, running up external debt by their voracious cash demands, and
operating bloated, bureaucratized enterprises at such low levels of productivity
that they weighed down the whole economy. They had failed to create jobs in the
numbers expected and those created were concentrated in three or four privileged
northern towns while most of the country remained an economic backwater. The
lack of attention to agriculture and consumer industry generated demand for
imports that wasted foreign currency reserves and threatened the ability of the
economy to capitalize growth in the future (Ruedy, 2005, 233).
Inheriting a litany of public complaints, Bendjedid adopted the first five-year plan, which
aimed at providing solutions to many of these problems. Under this plan, industry was
given only 38.6% of the state’s total investment, which was used to complete pre-existing
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projects. The agricultural sector received an increased 11.7% of investment, and there
was also an increase in housing, healthcare, and other social infrastructure projects.
A second five-year plan was passed by the FLN Central Committee in May 1984
with the recognition that “means of implementation were at least as important as goals
themselves in achieving the better life” (Ruedy 2005, 233). The regime was trying to
prepare its citizens for the continuation of the economic crisis that would occur before the
improvements to the system would be felt by the general public. Citizens’ faith in the
regime was wavering, and before the reforms had time to make an impact on the
economy, the society began to react violently. In 1985, there was serious rioting in the
Casbah and by 1986 the protests, organized primarily by young students, had spread
across the country to Algiers, Oran, Skikda, Constantine, and Setif. The riots, strikes, and
protests of 1987 were a “continuation of student unrest but also the beginning of labor
unrest spreading rapidly from one sector to another” (Ruedy, 2005, 248). Eight years
after the first Benjedid economic plan went into effect, wages remained stagnant, while
prices soared and unemployment was at its highest rate in over a decade. There had not
been an increase in new capital in the industrial sector as was hoped for, and popular
perceptions of corruption within the government were furthering the feelings of
resentment.
Protests and riots had been plaguing the nation during the month of September
1988 and finally these events reached the city of Algiers on October 2, when postal
employees went on strike. There were calls within the city for a general strike on October
4, and although such a strike did not occur, “secondary school students did walk out and
their movement spread rapidly amongst laborers and unemployed young people” (Ruedy
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2005, 248). The next day the movement turned into a “popular revolt against a system
legitimized by the ideals of November 1954” (Tahi 1995, 198). Thousands of young men
stormed the center of the city, where they destroyed government and party property. Over
the next two days the movement, which included student groups, unionists, and
fundamentalists, spread to Oran, Blida, Annaba and many other towns throughout the
nation.
The response of the FLN was quick and swift. Although the party did not outright
blame the Islamists, it claimed that the “irresponsibles were manipulated by secret
partners” (Stora 2001, 196). The President called in the military to restore order on
October 6 and announced a state of siege (Mortimer 1996, 21). The military repression
that would come to dominate the next decade had begun; the armed forces used clubs,
tear gas, live ammunition, and several different kinds of automatic weapons to quell the
masses. In the end, “before order was more or less restored on October 10, hundreds of
Algerians-mostly young men- had died and thousands had been taken into custody where
many were tortured” (Ruedy 2005, 248). This response left the country angered at the
military as well as the single-party system and the repression did not halt opposition but
rather encouraged its growth. Citizens from all classes began to call for the
administration’s recognition of its role in the events in addition to a change of
government.
President Benjedid responded to these calls for change and by the end of the
month he had outlined a clear strategy for reform, which included making the
government responsible to Parliament (Assemblée Populaire et Nationale- APN),
summoning a party congress to consider other constitutional reforms, and asking for a
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popular referendum on proposed reforms that would revise the 1976 Constitution (Ruedy
2005, 249). There were three goals in the proposed referendum which the regime hoped
would please the people: “separation of state and the FLN, freedom of candidacies in
municipal and legislative elections and the independence of ‘mass organizations’” (Stora
2001, 197). On November 3, Algerians approved the constitutional amendments with
ninety-three percent of the vote and President Benjedid appointed Colonel Kasdi Merbah
as the state’s new Prime Minister. That December the sixth regular party Congress met to
discuss the next candidate for Presidency. Despite receiving strong criticism of the new
changes that he tried to implement, which undercut the privileged position of the FLN,
Benjedid received the nomination as the FLN candidate for Presidency for a third term
and was elected on December 22 (Ruedy 2005, 249). After securing his power, Benjedid
was able to bring his reforms directly to the people. In presenting these reforms, the
President hoped to give the people enough political freedoms to temporarily placate
them, which would in turn protect his administration.
The Constitution of 1989 and the Upheaval of the Single-Party System
In February 1989 Algerian voters overwhelming approved the new Constitution,
which had the goal of creating a more plural system in the country and provide the break
with the past that the citizens so desired. This new Constitution guaranteed “the freedoms
and basic rights of man and the citizen” including freedom of expression, association and
meeting (Ruedy 2005, 250). With the previous political system in Algeria, the
Presidency, the FLN party, and the army were the three main centers of power, yet the
new Constitution only allowed the President to retain his influence. The new document
no longer mentioned socialism or the FLN and Article 40 opened the nation to a multi-
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party system (Stora 2001, 198). The army was characterized as “a military institution for
the defense of the unity and sovereignty of the nation” and in March the army officially
withdrew its participation from all political bodies (Ruedy 2005, 250). There was an
enormous amount of excitement surrounding these changes, yet the regime had not
effectively prepared for the differences that would come with a more plural and
democratic government.
After the approval of the new Constitution, there was a wealth of legislation from
the APN designed to expedite the democratization process. It produced “a new law on
political associations, a new electoral law, and a new public information act” in addition
to abolishing the State Security Council, the main purpose of which was punish political
deviation (Ruedy 2005, 251). It was also during this time that Prime Minister Merbah
tried to reform business operations and restart the growth of the economy. Merbah’s
economic policy encountered difficulties, including
the challenge of learning the new methods of management, the absence of a stock
exchange, the scarcity of means for making foreign debt payments, the lack of
social consensus, the lack of an economic and democratic culture within civil
society, and the blocking of reform by the deputies, all of whom belonged to the
FLN (Stora 2001, 199).
These problems in addition to the continuation of strikes, shortages, and inflation led
President Benjedid to fire Merbah and replace him with Mouloud Hamrouche.
Citizens took advantage of the new pluralistic government and the weakness of
the current regime by forming new parties to challenge the status-quo. Leaders of parties
who had previously opposed the FLN returned from exile, including Hocine Ait Ahmed
of the Front des Forces Socialists (FFS) and Ahmed Ben Bella, who returned to lead the
Mouvement pour la Démocratie en Algérie (MDA). It was not solely pre-established
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parties that came to challenge the regime, however; in fact forty-four parties were formed
within that first year. Human rights leagues, women’s rights organizations, and cultural
movements all developed and “the democratization process was real, even though the
FLN remained a dominant party” (Stora 2001, 199). Of the parties that emerged, thirtythree were officially recognized, the majority of which were secular in nature. Of the
three parties that were religious, it would be the Front Islamique du Salut that would
come to be the largest threat to the FLN and its grip on power.
The Formation of the FIS
The Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) was a coalition of Islamic groups whose
leaders came together on February 18, 1989 to discuss their unification. Although it
publicly announced its formation of an allied party on March 10, the group was
composed of two main currents, the radical Salafis and the Djazarists (Ruedy 2005, 251).
The members of the Islamic movement, including both the Salafis and the Djazarists,
recruited not only the underprivileged but also the young elite in the mass education
institutions who faced a lack of “job outlets that corresponded to their qualifications and
met their aspirations, as well as a lack of access to any posts of responsibility” (Tahi
1995, 215). The agenda of the Djazarists did not contain a revolutionary dimension and it
believed in the “necessity of change, informing the population about the relevance of
Islam to a modern life, and activism in spreading Islamic values and practices” (Ruedy,
2005, 251). It felt that the taking of power legally through elections was the only way to
truly have a stable Islamic state. The Salafists, on the other hand, felt the necessity to
establish “an immediate Islamic state after the taking of power by arms” (Tahi, 1995,
215). This section was an offshoot of reformist salafism and demanded rapid
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transformation of the Algerian state and society (Ruedy 2005, 251). The majority of this
sect was comprised of imams or preachers in districts that subscribed to the traditional
Arabic language and Islamic education. Many of the Salafists were also former members
of the Buyali band, a group that had taken up arms in the 1980s, or veterans of the war in
Afghanistan (Mortimer 1996, 23). It would be the Salafists who would later form the
Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA), a military organization that would make it extremely
difficult to hold negotiations between the regime and that FIS front.
The official authorization of the FIS marked the first time a Muslim and Arab
nation sanctioned a political party that had Islam at its foundation, a fact that was made
very clear with its official declaration. The group highlighted seven key objectives, some
of which would be abandoned as the struggle for representation continued. The FIS was
initially founded with the goals of “the preservation of the unity of the Muslim umma, the
substitution of Islamic ideology for imported ideology, movement via a middle path,
tactical moderation, collective action, encouraging the spirit of initiative, and the
safeguarding of Islamic historical and cultural heritage” (Ruedy 2005, 252). The party
was led by Abassi Madani, who served as President, and Ali Benhadj, the FIS’ VicePresident. Many in the FLN party feared the potential of the FIS, knowing the important
role that religion plays in Algerian society, but the President and Prime Minister believed
that institutional guarantees were strong enough to defeat any threat.
FIS Victories and the Military Coup
With the new formation of a multi-party system, the President announced that
local and provincial elections would be held in June 1990. The electoral system was
established in such a way that it would overwhelmingly favor the largest party, which
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was presumed to be the FLN, and as a result many of the smaller, secular parties
including the FFS decided to boycott these elections. In addition to unfair practices, these
parties had little time to establish a grassroots foundation whereas the FIS, which had
links to over 9,000 mosques, had an “instant and effective organization” (Ruedy 2005,
253). On June 12, the FIS party won 54% of the popular vote, whereas the FLN garnered
28%; these results translated to the FIS obtaining control of 800 out of 1500 municipal
councils including Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and Annaba (Ruedy 2005, 253). At the
time,
the government thought that economic and social measures would allow it to limit
the FIS’ influence. This was a misunderstanding of the significant grassroots work
done by the Islamist militants; but above all, it was a poor judgment of what made
the FIS strong: its conception of the nation as exclusively Muslim and rid of all
foreign influence (Stora 2001, 203).
To those who voted, a vote for the FIS party was seen as a vote in protest of the current
regime, yet the outcome of this democratic election was not what the FLN or the military
had hoped for.
Immediately the FIS began to implement and enforce its Islamist agenda which
sometimes conflicted with constitutional requirements. Within its districts, the
organization began closing schools that were co-educational, forbidding married women
to work outside of the home, requiring all women to wear headscarves, and prohibiting
all alcohol (Ruedy 2005, 253). The FIS strengthened its new-found authority with the
start of the Gulf War. As an organization which opposed all foreign influence, it began to
call on the FLN to assist its Islamic brethren and wanted to send volunteers to fight
against Western forces. The FLN refused to further stretch its already limited resources
and thousands of people marched on the streets in protest. Despite conflicting opinions
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toward Saddam Hussein amongst the Algerian population, all parties condemned the
actions of the West and once again provided the Islamists with leverage against the
current regime.
The FIS party began lobbying for parliamentary elections under the new multiparty system to replace the 1987 APN. After “great controversy and internal splits, the
regime decided to go ahead with parliamentary elections in December 1991 and foolishly
adopted an electoral system similar to the French two-cycle, winner-take-all model”
(Pierre 1995, 135). In an attempt to ensure a pro-FLN outcome of the elections,
legislation was passed which promoted gerrymandering favoring the party, the
implementation of a ban on campaigning at mosques and schools, and the repeal of the
right of men to cast votes for their wives” (Ruedy 2005, 254). Islamists naturally opposed
these measures and organized a strike, which the military interpreted as an assault on the
state. While “the strike was not especially well organized or successful, demonstrations
and the occupation of public places by FIS supporters” made the military fearful of a
possible assault (Ruedy 2005, 254). The military believed that the policies of the
Homrouche government were too permissive and after severe pressure from Major
General Khaled Nezzar, the President declared a state of siege on June 4, which resulted
in fifty deaths and hundreds of arrests (Ruedy 2004, 254). A new Prime Minister, Sid
Ahmed Ghozali, was appointed and promised reform of the new electoral laws. Although
this temporarily placated the FIS, the two leaders of the party were calling for an Islamic
Republic and threatened the regime with a jihad by the end of the month. The army
quickly moved in again and arrested Madani, Benhadj, and hundreds more. The FIS
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Council quickly named Abdelkader Hachani as the temporary leader of the party and
outbursts of violence continued in the months leading up to the election.
The first round of the elections took place on December 26 and the government
continued to assume that it could turn this winner-take-all system “to its own advantage,
winning more seats than it would be entitled to through a popular vote” (Pierre 1995,
135). The opposite actually occurred and even though the FIS received one million votes
fewer than in the municipal elections, “the non-Islamist vote was so badly fragmented”
that it became clear that the FIS would overwhelmingly win the second round of elections
(Pierre 1995, 135). In this first round, the FIS received 47.54% of the vote, which
translated to 188 out of 430 districts, whereas the FLN won 15 and the FFS won 26
districts (Ruedy 2005, 255). The government and FLN claimed that the elections were
invalid since there were massive voting irregularities and an abstention rate of 39%, but
despite these serious concerns it appeared that the President was going to continue with
the second round of elections (Ruedy 2005, 255). Despite his intentions to fulfill his
promise for a more democratic and pluralistic government, Benjedid’s actions would not
be accepted by the majority of the regime.
Members of the government’s cabinet, including military officials, felt that the
transfer of power to the FIS would be an utter disaster for a variety of reasons. Some in
the regime were, “concerned about preserving the secular, nationalist traditions of the
nation and others about maintaining its fragile transition to democracy. Still others were
concerned about losing personal power and access to wealth” (Ruedy 2005, 255). The
military leaders had come to a common decision and informed President Benjedid that he
was to step down as the leader of Algeria. He resigned on January 11, 1992, after
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dissolving the Parliament; this created the difficult question of leadership since the
replacement, according to the constitution, is the Speaker of the APN. The military
leaders of the coup decided that power would be passed to the only constitutional body of
power left, which was a Presidential advisory committee, known as the Haut Comite de
Sécurité (HCS). The HCS was a “hastily convened body made up of Ghozali, the Prime
Minister, along with Benhabiles, President of the Supreme Court, Benkhelil, the Justice
Minister, Brahimi, the Foreign Affairs Minister, and three senior military officials:
Nezzar, the Defense Minister, Belkheir, the Interior Minister, and Guenaizia, the Chief of
Staff” (Evans 2007, 171). The HCS declared that the December election was annulled
and that the second round of legislative elections would not go on as planned. To fill the
vacuum of power that now existed, the organization created the Haut Comite d’État
(HCE), a five-person political body that would serve as a collective presidency until
elections could be held at the end of 1993. This new organization now created a severely
unstable political situation in Algeria, where the regime in power was lacking legitimacy
while another party was willing to use violent actions to obtain power.
The High State Council and the Descent into War
The HCE was immediately rejected by the major political parties in Algeria,
including the certain members of the FLN, who believed that “nobody was entitled to
stop the electoral process” (Tahi 1995, 200). Nearly a quarter of the population had voted
for the FIS during the election and naturally they felt that “they had played by the rules
and passionately believed that the second round should have proceeded” (Ruedy 2005,
258). It was at this time that the Salafists came into ascension, as it had proved that the
Djazarists’ theory of political action held little clout in overthrowing the current regime.
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In the beginning of 1992, Algeria was a deeply divided country in need of a leader
who could rejuvenate and reconcile. This individual came in the form of Mohamed
Boudiaf, a hero from the Revolution who had been in exile in Morocco for many years.
He initially delivered harsh criticisms against both the regime and the FIS party and
believed that he could, “steer the country between the dual shoals of the old FLN order
and the new Islamism while averting a complete takeover by the army” (Mortimer 1996,
26). Boudiaf returned to Algeria and became the acting President of the High State
Council. The other four members of the HCE were Major General Khaled Nezzar,
Colonel Ali Kafi, Tidjani Haddam, a former minister of religious affairs, and Ali Haroun,
who had been the head of the Office National des Anciens Moudjahidine. Within the
HCE the impact of the army was felt and it adopted a goal of completely repressing the
FIS before the new elections in 1993.
The division between Djazarists and Salafis became increasingly pronounced as
the Algerian regime relied more on violence as a means of suppressing the opposition.
The Djazarists had yet to form a military branch to counter the actions of the Salafis. The
group had evolved “from an informal, mostly francophone group of Algiers University
faculty and students and had developed in the intellectual path laid out by Malek
Bennabi, a French-educated professor” (Ruedy 2005, 251). The Djazarists party came to
power within the FIS organization after the consultative council “named Abdelkader
Hachani, a representative of the moderate djazarist wing, as interim head of the party” in
the middle of 1991 (Ruedy 2005, 254). Under his leadership, street activism markedly
declined and the anti-violence message of the Djazarists was promoted. Even after the
establishment of the HCE, Hachani and other FIS leaders called “upon demonstrators to
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avoid violence and sought cooperation with other parties- such as the FFS and the FLN”
(Ruedy 2005, 259). The policy that the Algerian administration adopted in the beginning
of 1992 made it increasingly difficult for FIS supporters to embrace the ideology of the
Djazarists.
Despite the change in leadership within the FIS, the Salafis, which was primarily
comprised of imams or preachers in popular districts with traditional Arabic language and
Islamic education, was validated in its quest for jihad with the cancellation of the 1992
elections. It was also during this time that the organization began to separate into smaller
armed groups. The main one from 1991 until 1993 was the Mouvement Islamique Armé
(MIA), which was reconstituted with the “belief in the efficacy and importance of armed
struggle” (Willis 1997, 269). Although the group preferred not to attack the regime
directly, it began to launch individual operations against the security forces after the
establishment of the HCE in 1992 (Willis 1997, 269). By the summer of that year the
MIA had become had become the main source of organized armed resistance within the
party. Despite the effectiveness of the MIA, it was not the only armed group to exist
during this time; “Personal ambition and ideological differences played a significant part
in the formation of the dissident groupings” (Willis 1997, 280). The MIA was a
forerunner for the Groupement Islamique Armé (GIA), which was based on the ideology
that “We reject the religion of democracy. We affirm that political pluralism is equal to
sedition. It has never been our intention to participate in elections or enter parliament.
The right to legislate belongs solely to God” (Willis 1997, 282). Although the leader of
the GIA, Mansour Meliani, was arrested by security forces in the middle of June 1992,
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the organization would regroup in 1993 and become one of the most violent factions
within the FIS.
Although the Djazarists continued to call for an avoidance of violence, the army
began to arrest suspected members of the party the day after it was announced that the
second round of elections were cancelled. News of “the arrests and violent measures
taken by police brought dramatic increases in the number and size of protests, which
ranged from street marches to blockades of public buildings, student strikes, and massive
demonstrations outside mosques after Friday prayers” (Ruedy 2005, 259). Party leaders,
including Djazarist leader Hachani, were arrested for encouraging revolts against the
army and the government began to severely limit the press coverage that the FIS actions
were getting. Despite these measures, the protests continued and on February 9, 1992,
the High State Council declared a state of siege, which “empowered the Interior Minister
to take all actions necessary to maintain law and order” (Ruedy 2005, 259). The next day,
for the first time since its formation, the Islamists publicly declared responsibility for the
deaths of eight police officers; with these mass arrests it was no longer possible for the
Djazarists to provide a balance to the Salafis’ argument. By early February it was
estimated that between fifty and a hundred and fifty people had been killed and between
two hundred and seven hundred had been wounded in the protests; several thousand had
been arrested and sent to internment camps (Ruedy 2005, 259). The goal of dismantling
the FIS was growing with urgency as the political crisis continued.
On March 4 of the same year, the Algiers Judicial Council officially dissolved the
FIS political party and by the end of the month the government had disbanded nearly half
of the councils that the FIS had won in the municipal elections. These actions of the
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government did not destroy the Islamist movement but simply forced it underground.
During this time, Boudiaf “strove to avert the slide into violence by promising a radical
change of the old order and criticizing the corruption which had characterized the
Benjedid years” (Mortimer 1996, 27). He did not support the principles of the Islamist
parties but understood that acts of compromise, such as the closing of some of the
internment camps, were necessary to avoid a catastrophic conflict. His opposition to the
FLN made him a threat to those in power and his willingness to negotiate made him a
target for organizations like the Armed Islamic Group, which believed that compromise
would not result in an Islamic Republic. Boudiaf was assassinated on June 29 although it
was never determined if it was the act of the Islamists or the government itself.
On July 3, Ali Kafi became the new President of the High State Council and
inherited a further deteriorating political and security situation as well as a fragile
economy. The murder of Boudiaf “hastened the polarization into two camps: the military
and the Islamist movement, which gradually fell under the sway of its most violent
elements” (Mortimer 1996, 27). At first, Islamist violence, led by the MIA, was directed
at soldiers, police, and their facilities, yet on August 26 the rules of the conflict changed
when a bomb exploded in the international terminal at the Algiers airport. This marked
one of the first random acts of violence against citizens and as a result ten people were
killed and at least one hundred were injured (Ruedy 2005, 261). By November, the
estimates of the number of deaths ranged from three thousand to six thousand people and
it was at this time that the government imposed a curfew in the major cities that served as
hotbeds for FIS activity in Algeria.
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Just as there was a division within the FIS organization over the use of violence,
there was a division within the current regime between the Eradicators and the
Conciliators. The Eradicators were composed of members from the Rally for Culture and
Democracy, a liberal, secular political party, the Parti de L’Avant Garde Socialiste, a
communist organization that was the second most powerful party in the 1960s and 1970s,
and the Sécurité Militaire, all of whom banned together to refuse a referendum and
demand the annihilation of the FIS. The Conciliators were comprised of members of the
FFS, FLN, MDA, and HAMAS, a moderate Islamist party, and demanded “a gesture of
receptivity from the authorities and the inclusion of the ex-FIS in the dialogue” (Tahi
1995, 205). These divisions would continue to plague Algeria and make it extremely
difficult for any form of popular resolution to be produced.
A year after the resignation of President Benjedid, the cancellation of the
elections, and the establishment of the High State Council, Islamist organizations more
than doubled its attacks, which now included non-combatant individuals. General Nezzar
narrowly escaped an assassination attempt with a car bomb in February 1993. The Armed
Islamic Group (GIA) began to reform as a coalition of urban terrorist groups, which were
responsible for the first assassinations of “civilian intellectuals” beginning in March 1993
(Mortimer 1996, 28). Former Prime Minister Qasdi Mirbah published an open letter
calling for the FIS to enter into negotiations with other political parties, namely those of
the Conciliators, as a means of forming a government of national union. Since he was
referring to negotiations and a mutual compromise as a means of ending the violence, he
posed a threat to the ideology of the GIA and was murdered by the organization in
August (Mortimer, 1996, 32). In October, three French consular officers were kidnapped
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and released with a note demanding that all foreigners leave the country by the end of the
month; beginning in November, these Islamist armed forces began to specifically target
all foreigners who refused to heed this warning (Ruedy 2005, 261). In the end the GIA
killed thirty-four foreigners between September 1992 and March 1993 (Roberts 2003,
154). This naturally concerned many Western nations, specifically France, which began
to send weapons and financial aid to the Algerian military as the attacks on its citizens by
the GIA increased.
As 1993 came to a close, the mandate for the High State Council was set to expire
and a new President was to be elected. The National Dialogue Commission was formed
in September 1993 with the “specific task of achieving a consensus with the opposition
parties on the nature of the new governing body that the HCE had pledged itself to cede
power to when its own two year ‘mandate’ expired at the end of the year” (Willis 1997,
311). It was hoped that the Commission would result in a reconciliation conference
attended by all of the political parties, but since the Conciliators refused to participate
without the FIS, the talks were futile. Recognizing that the nation was no more stable
now than it was two years ago, the High Security Council appointed Defense Minister
Liamine Zeroual as President for a three year term and dissolved the HCE.
The Insurgency in the Civil War
After 1993, the amount of violence within the nation intensified and it was
estimated that the attacks and murders attributed to both the Islamist groups and the
actions of reprisal by the Algerian forces resulted in 30,000 deaths by the end of 1994;
after May of that year between forty-five and sixty people were killed everyday (Stora
2001, 215). Islamist armed groups became the most effective methods of promoting the
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ideology of the FIS religious movement as it increased its violence over the next two
years. Even before the political crisis that befell Algeria in 1992, there were Islamic
groups which believed that jihad was the only way to obtain an Islamic state, including
the Mouvement Islamique Armée (MIA), which would later battle the GIA for control
over the Islamist movement. After 1992, the GIA would become the most successful,
radical, and violent wing of the movement and was developed by numerous insurgency
cells which banded together. Its official slogan was “No dialogue, No truce, No
reconciliation” and it condemned all non-believers in jihad, even if they were active
members of the FIS party (Ruedy 2005, 263). Under Ahmed Ben Aicha, the Armée
Islamique du Salut (AIS) was formed in May 1994. By this time the FIS had considered
negotiating with the Algerian government and therefore was labeled as a traitor by the
GIA; therefore the AIS was in direct opposition the armed movement of the GIA (Ruedy
2005, 264). AIS attracted many FIS loyalists as well as some fighters from the MIA and a
considerable number of army deserters. It proclaimed itself the “armed wing of the FIS”,
and although it did maintain that jihad was a way of establishing an Islamic state, it did
not feel that this policy was imperative; it also condemned the specific targeting of
civilians.
Despite the formation of the AIS as a means of balancing the actions of the GIA,
the latter increased their terrorist attacks on civilians. On the rebellion’s side there was a
mass attack “by 150-200 armed men on the prison of Tazoult, near Batna, in which some
900 prisoners (1,684 according to a FIS statement) were freed, mostly FIS militants and
condemned Islamist terrorists” (Roberts 2003, 152). The armed Islamist group also
murdered the Director of Communications in the office of the Prime Minister and one
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week later killed a senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; these two attacks
meant that “the terror was now unprecedentedly close to front-rank political officeholders” (Roberts 2003, 152). It was also during this time that the GIA announced that
“anyone who attended a regime school, followed a lifestyle contrary to Islamic teaching,
or failed to support jihad was a target” and as a result they began setting off bombs in
restaurants, post offices, markets, cinemas, and other public places (Ruedy 205, 264). It
adopted the policy of compliance terrorism, or terrorism directed at Muslims to obtain
compliance, as well as organizational terrorism, which had the goal of strengthening the
organization. These are the same policies that the FLN had successfully used in the 1950s
to defeat the French. On October 6, 1994 the Minister of Education announced that over
six hundred schools had been burned or destroyed and fifty civilian teachers had been
killed (Stora 2001, 216). Communes and villages were forced to pay large fees to
members of the GIA and those who did not would suffer large scale massacres. It was
through threats and massive acts of violence that the GIA obtained the support, or at the
very least compliance, of the general public.
It was not solely the policy of the Islamists that caused massive casualties.
Civilians also suffered under the tactics of the Algerian police and military forces. These
tactics included the “indiscriminate targeting of young males in communes supportive of
the FIS as well as arrests, torture aimed at extracting information and summary
executions” (Ruedy 2005, 265). There is also evidence that soldiers acted out terrorist
acts dressed as insurgents as a way to increase support for their goal, which was to
maintain the power of the current regime. By dressing in disguise, the military would be
promoting the image that the violent acts of the Islamists discredited their claim to power.
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It was also reported that attacks on civilians near military posts would generate no
response from the forces itself, which chose only to help those that it knew were never
pro-FIS.
Elections and Constitutions of 1996
President Zeroual had previously associated himself with the Conciliators and
believed that military means alone would not restore civil order. Although he and his
government carried on dialogue with the leaders of FIS, “Zeroual was limited in the
actual concessions he could grant” because the military members of the cabinet refused to
give into demands, such as the release of FIS leaders from prison (Ruedy 2005, 265). At
the same time, the rivalry between the GIA and the MIA “caused them to up the ante and
to engage in a race to expand from their initial bases into new territory, and this situation
in turn made it impossible for the FIS to respond unequivocally to Zeroual’s gestures in
its direction” (Roberts 2003, 155). The military insisted that the first concession come
from the FIS yet the political leaders of the opposing camp could “ill afford to give an
order that the armed insurgents would ignore”; both sides were limited by extremists
(Mortimer 1996, 34). Zeroual once again attempted to initiate negotiations in the summer
of 1994, when he reopened talks with the two main leaders of the FIS, who were
imprisoned in Blida. This “elicited two letters from them in which, alongside a number of
demands, the FIS pledged to ‘respect political pluralism and alternation in power via
elections’” (Mortimer 1996, 34). The President took this as a sign of good faith and
released Madani and Benhadj to house arrest in Algiers, where they would have
unrestricted communications. The forces of the GIA released a statement reiterating its
refusal to negotiate with the government while anti-Islamists criticized the government
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for a “unilateral concession” (Mortimer 1996, 34). As the fortieth anniversary of the start
of the War for Independence approached, negotiations came to a halt as neither party
could fulfill the preconditions of the other.
Encouraged by the willingness of the President to consider dialogue with the
opposition, and his announcement in November that Presidential elections would be held
in Algeria before the end of 1995, several of the major political parties, including the FIS,
FLN, FFS, and MDA, met with the Saint Egidio Catholic community in Rome to once
again initiate negotiations -- this time without the restrictions and preconditions of the
Algerian administration. It is important to note that by this time the GIA was a “headless
monster, inflicting senseless murder and violence on all sides” (Evans 2007, 222). Just as
the GIA was separate from the FIS, so to was the FLN separate from the Algerian regime,
which was now overtaken by the military. The talks in November led to four basic
principles: “the rejection of violence, support for democracy, open competitive elections,
and respect for human rights” (Mortimer 1996, 35). Despite the condemnation of the
Algerian government, the parties met again and on January 13, 1995 signed the Platform
for a National Contract, a document which represented a wide variety of political
opinions that existed in Algeria. The Platform called for the convening of a national
conference to create a transitional authority that would oversee free and pluralistic
elections under the rules of the 1989 Constitution. It also outlined “the basic values and
principles underlying its program and the system it wished to implement. These included
the affirmation of human rights, popular sovereignty, the rule of law, and the separation
of powers” (Ruedy 2005, 267). The document also assured the freedom of religion to all,
while acknowledging that Islam has played an important role in shaping Algeria’s
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identity. The Rome Platform “demonstrated what most people already knew, that the
political parties were not the source of the impasse… and that they were not so deeply
divided by ideological differences as to be unable to agree on the basic principles
necessary to the foundation of the system of constitutional party-political competition”
(Roberts 2003, 172). Despite the positive measures that these parties tried to take, the
efforts were rejected by the government out of fear that it would force the military to
admit to its atrocities.
Around the same time of the Platform of Rome, the President installed a special
commission to help prepare for the Presidential elections on November 16, 1995. The FIS
was still unable to participate in the elections, therefore the major parties that had talked
in Rome refused to take part in the voting. Only four candidates were able to collect the
75,000 signatures necessary; besides Zeroual, the entrants were Said Saadi, of the
secularist RCD party, Mahfoud Nahnah, the head of moderate Islamist HAMAS, and
Nouredine Boukhrouh, the leader for the liberal Islamic movement PRA. The
environment leading up to the elections was extremely tense and the GIA circulated death
threats to those who voted; despite this fact, the turnout was nearly seventy-five percent
and the elections were basically free and fair (Ruedy 2005, 267). In the end Zéroual won
another term in office with nearly sixty-one percent of the vote.
Despite an increase in violence that occurred in January 1996, the re-elected
President announced that the government would hold parliamentary elections the
following year, pending the draft of a new constitution. Algeria’s fourth constitution
made numerous changes, the most important being the reinforcement of the executive
branch. The new constitution “gave Algeria a bicameral legislature for the first time
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where the lower house, the APN, was to be chosen by popular vote every five years, and
the members of the upper house, the Council of the Nation, were selected two-thirds by
communal and wilaya councils and the remaining third by the President” (Ruedy 2005,
268). It also limited the President’s tenure to two five-year terms and although it
promoted the creation of political parties it stated that “no political party could be
founded on a ‘religious, linguistic, racial, sex, corporatist, or regional basis’” (Ruedy,
2005, 268). With this new constitution, the President and government tried to ensure that
there would not be a repeat of the 1991 catastrophe.
Despite the fact that 1997 was the bloodiest year to date, the parliamentary
elections were held, a massive step in overcoming the single-party system of the 1980s
and the military regime of the 1990s. On June 5, 1997 the Rassemblement Nationale
Démocratique, a new party formed by regime supporters including the Prime Minister,
received the largest number of votes, totaling thirty-two percent or a hundred and fifty-six
out of three hundred and eighty seats (Ruedy 2005, 268). The Mouvement pour la Societe
et de la Paix, formally known as HAMAS, garnered sixty-nine seats and the FLN won
sixty-two seats (Ruedy 2005, 268). Nearly all parties protested the results, making such
claims as a lack of equal access to electronic media or that ballot boxes were destroyed.
Despite the overwhelmingly bitter tone towards these elections, it is important to note
that all the parties who met at the Platform of Rome did actively participate.
The Continuation of Violence and the Presidential Elections
In the months immediately following the elections there was once again a massive
outbreak of violence. Members of the GIA and other Islamist forces conducted massacres
in several major cities to the south and east of Algiers, an area that had popularly
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supported the FIS in the 1991 elections. One massacre was in the town of Bentalha, ten
miles south of the capital. On September 22, 1997 over four hundred people, regardless
of their sex or age, “were pitilessly slaughtered” (Roberts 2003, 309). According to
witness accounts, “authorities refused requests from Bentalha’s residents for arms with
which to defend themselves, security forces were stationed on the edge of the city,
knowing what was taking place, troops manning the roadblock into the city stopped
citizens from nearby villages from coming to the rescue, and the assailants were allowed
to freely leave the city once they were finished” (Roberts 2003, 309). There were once
again claims that the assailants were not Islamists but actually members of the army who
were part of a special commando unit. This has never been formally proven although it
would correspond with previous claims against the military, as well as its philosophy to
perform any action that could discredit the Islamists. These violent acts continued into
1998 as the international community began to investigate the Algerian problem in forums
such as the United Nations. As the President’s record came under question, he announced
on September 11, 1998 that there would be presidential elections in February 1999.
In response to the announcement, forty-eight individuals announced their
candidacies, yet in the end only seven were able to be confirmed by the Constitutional
Council. The seven candidates were comprised of
“former Prime Ministers Moloud Hamrouche and Mokdad Sifi, Hocine Ait
Ahmed of the FFS, Youssef Khateb, who had chaired the abortive national
dialogue in 1994-95, moderate Islamists Abdallah Djaballah and Ahmed Taleb al
Ibrahimi, and former Foreign Minister Abdelazi Bouteflika”,
all of whom were powerful civilians (Ruedy 2005, 275). Bouteflika was the clear favorite
of the military and although they never supported him outright, he did have more funds to
spend on campaigning, as well as the support of the four most important parties in
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Parliament. The six opposition candidates claimed that there were irregularities in the
voting system and demanded to meet with the President prior to the election; he declined
to meet with them and in response “they decided upon collective withdrawal from the
elections and the non-recognition of the legitimacy of the results of the polls” (Ruedy
2005, 275). These drastic changes to the election process, less than twenty-four hours
before voting booths opened in Algeria, convinced nearly forty percent of the population
not to participate in the election. In the end, President Bouteflika was inaugurated on
April 27, 1999.
Bouteflika first chose to launch efforts for national reconciliation and quickly
gained the support of the major leaders of the FIS party, including Abassi Madani. On
July 13 he issued the Law of Civil Concord, which stated that it was providing the
government with, “special measures to relieve from standard penalties, persons involved
in, or who have been involved in, acts of terrorism or subversion who express in good
faith their wish to cease their criminal activities, and to grant them the opportunity to put
in concrete form this wish through re-entry into society” (Ruedy 2005, 276). Through this
document, the individuals of the Islamist movement, specifically the AIS, were to come
forward to the authorities, who then would grant amnesty to the fighters. The referendum
for the Law of Civil Concord was held on September 16, 1999 and passed with 98.6% of
the popular vote; by January 13, 2000, the final date for compliance, roughly 5,500
militants had turned themselves over to the authorities (Ruedy 2005, 277). The Law of
Civil Concord confirmed the strong desire across political barriers for the end of violence
and upheaval throughout Algeria.
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An Undefined End to a Civil War
While some members of the GIA did turn themselves in by the designated date,
many resented the blanket amnesty granted to the AIS fighters and were fearful of the
punishment they would receive should they surrender. Consequently, hundreds of guerilla
forces from the GIA continued to fight and formed a coalition with another organization
known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) (Ruedy 2005, 277). The
Law of the Civil Concord was not only disliked by the members of the GIA, but it was
also disliked by the military. The army “launched major offensives against the guerrillas
immediately after January 13 and the result was that the number of violent incidents
actually increased during 2000 and that the number of deaths, rising to about 5,000, was
roughly double that of 1999” (Ruedy 2005, 277). Yet after that year, the number of
violent outbursts has continued to decline and in 2004, Nabil Sahraoui, the emir of the
GSPC, was killed after his group had ambushed a military unit.
The Algerian Civil War has brought about a variety of results, some positive
while others extremely negative. The political system is certainly more pluralistic and
democratic than it was in the late 1980s and the country underwent yet another
Presidential election in 2004, when President Bouteflika was re-elected for a second term.
Yet, the road to experiencing this political state led to the division of a nation, one that is
still under a state of emergency, fifteen years later (US Department of State). The actions
of the military and Islamist guerilla groups have cost an estimated 150,000 lives with
many more wounded or imprisoned. It will take many years for the state to become fully
reconciled and prevail over the destruction of this conflict.
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Conclusion: From Victims to Victimizers
After analyzing the two main conflicts that affected Algeria in the twentieth
century, despite noting some differences, one can draw a large number of parallels
leading to the conclusion that the actions of the French in the War for Independence were
strikingly similar to those of the Algerian administration in the 1990s. In addition, it can
be claimed that the actions of the FLN in the 1950s greatly influenced the FIS policy of
the 1990s. Finally, it could also be hypothesized that had the French pulled out of Algeria
after the first year of the “Phony War”, the course of Algerian politics would have been
altered significantly towards a more peaceful outcome. It is not solely the actors in the
conflicts that remained similar, but tactics and events as well as political actions and
propaganda transcended the thirty years between the conflicts. The role of the FLN and
the French government are clearly defined during the War for Independence, one
organization was fighting for political liberation while the other was trying to maintain
colonial holdings. These roles are not as clearly defined during the Civil War and yet the
argument could be made that the FLN administration had become the enemy, much like
the French, while the Islamist organization of the FIS was viewed as a source of freedom,
similar to the FLN in the 1950s. The victims of the War for Independence now became
the victimizers, with a new organization garnering sympathy for their cause.
There are differences that exist between the War for Independence and the
Algerian Civil War. Firstly, the War for Independence had a clearly defined, external
enemy and a common goal that would benefit almost all Muslim Algerians. This made it
somewhat easier for the FLN to garner support at the time; even moderate political
parties joined the battle for self-determination after France reacted so violently to the
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threat against its power. Neither the FLN nor the FIS were able to experience this type of
universal support during the Algerian Civil War. Because it was an internal conflict, it
was difficult to define which organization was the enemy and therefore the support of the
Algerian population was extremely divided.
There were some differences between the Algerian and the French administration
and the way both handled its military. Although both gave unbridled control to its armed
forces during the war, as discussed below, the French government was able to still
maintain control over the military. There were individuals in the French military who
disagreed with the policies of Charles de Gaulle and they tried to overthrow the
government with Barricade’s Week, the Generals’ Putsch, and the formation of the OAS.
Although these individuals certainly tried to override the policies of the French
government, they were unable to garner enough support or power to do so. The
administration was able to quickly quell any attempts of a coup. This was not the case
with the Algerian administration. The military had an extremely powerful role in the
Algerian government, even prior to the crisis in 1991. It was the military which pressured
the President to declare a state of siege in 1991, it was military leaders who informed
President Benjedid that he was to resign, and it is suspected that it was the military which
assassinated Boudiaf. The military successfully enacted a coup in 1992 and became the
puppet master of the Algerian government. The French government had a much more
distinct separation between its administration and its military, which allowed it to more
easily form and implement policy as well as enter into negotiations with the FLN in 1962.
It was the tangled relationship of the Algerian government and military which contributed
to such a long internal conflict.
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In addition to the differences in enemies and political goals, there were
dissimilarities between the make-up of the actors and their actions. The FLN of the 1950s
and the FIS of the 1990s differed in its armed factions. The FLN rallied with the ALN,
and the two organizations worked together to support a common goal through common
means. Both organizations believed in Algerian self-determination and its tactics and
methods of achieving that goal evolved together. Both used scare tactics, such as the
mutilations of French loyalists, to coerce Algerian citizens to provide food and funds.
The FLN and the ALN together, adopted a policy of collective reprisals and terrorism,
which would include acts against citizens. Although FLN battled with the MNA, that was
a separate political party with a separate ideology. This unity was not shared by the FIS
in the 1990s. The organization itself had two very distinct ideologies; the Salafis believed
that jihad was necessary to establish an Islamic political state, whereas the Djazarists
believed in the taking of power legally through elections. This division alone caused
distinct policy problems and made it difficult for the leaders of the FIS to have control
over their party, as shown by Hachani, the temporary leader of the FIS who was
undermined by the armed groups in 1991 and 1992. There were also many different
armed organizations under the common umbrella of the FIS. The GIA differed from the
MIA as well as the AIS and these political factions all battled each other based upon the
understanding that its individual political ideology was the best method possible to obtain
an Islamic state. The GIA refused to negotiate with the Algerian administration, whereas
the FIS and the AIS wanted to enter into peace talks. This internal split within the FIS
weakened the party greatly and although it implemented many of the same policies of the
FLN in the 1950s, the divisions prevented it from being successful.
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Despite the aforementioned differences, the revolutionary organizations of the
FLN in the 1950s and the FIS in the 1990s are extremely comparable in both ideology
and makeup. The FLN was comprised of a small group of young men who were in their
twenties and from middle-class backgrounds. The organization was based on a policy of
collective leadership, which worked to its advantage since it became difficult for the
French to completely dismantle it. Its doctrine strongly exemplified Islamic influences
and it turned to the Islamic ulama to garner support amongst the citizens and other
political parties. There were splits within the cause itself, as demonstrated by the constant
battle with the Mouvement National Algérien, but the party was generally united. The
FLN was unwilling to accept anything less than total independence, a quality of
stubbornness that that the FIS, and more specifically the GIA, would later adopt.
The FIS was also an organization that was founded on a coalition of Islamic
groups, and much like the FLN, was deeply divided in its cause between two main
currents, the Salafis and the Djazarists. The main body of the organization was found in
the young generations of Algerians, who were once again displeased with the
performance of their government. These men were unemployed and well-educated, with
no ties to the FLN or the War for Independence. There were more moderate factions of
the group, like the AIS, which believed that negotiations were possible, yet there were
also those, like the members of the GIA, who believed that negotiations were a sign of
defeat by the Algerian administration. Much like the FLN in the 1950s, the more
extremist factions of the FIS attacked the moderate groups, not wanting a different
viewpoint to gain popularity. With so many similarities, the FLN administration should
have been able to look at the FIS and understand what type of reaction was needed to
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quell such a group and yet it was unable to do so because it had changed so much since it
first took power.
The Changing Role of the FLN in Free Algeria
Besides the parallels in the insurgency organizations of both conflicts, there were
numerous similarities in the policies of the governments prior to the War for
Independence and the Civil War. Before the outbreak of total violence at Philippeville in
1955, France tried to offer a number of reforms, with the hopes of placating the FLN. It
promised the initiation of major public works projects as well as an increase in salary and
the improvement of the Algerian education system. Although these proposals were never
carried out because the Algerian government was disbanded, the efforts of the French
administration were nearly identical to those that the Algerian administration proposed in
the 1980s leading up to the crisis. Algerian President, Chadli Bendjedid, created two fiveyear plans, in 1979 and 1984; both tried to address issues such as high unemployment
rates and the monopolization of investment capital by basic industries. The President was
unable to make affective changes and soon the citizens of Algeria began to strike. The
leadership in Algeria, whether French or Algerian, was unable to properly address the
major problems that faced the country and this atmosphere of discontent led to the
promotion of civil uprising and Islamic ideology.
The reactions of the Algerian administration towards a threat to its power seemed
strongly influenced by those of its colonial predecessors. Although the French did not
initially view the FLN as a serious threat, it did respond to the action of the organization
with mass punishments. An example of collective reprisals by the French can be found in
its response to the Philippeville Massacre, where over twelve thousand people were killed
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or went missing. The FLN, which at the time used these mass punishments as a further
justification for extreme and violent reactions against the French, came to adopt a policy
of torture and extreme violence with its newfound power. It indiscriminately targeted
young males in areas known to support the FIS, conducted massive arrests, and
performed summary executions. Torture became the administration’s favorite technique
to extract information, much like a French policy that was highly controversial for many
years after the end of the War for Independence.
Another common reaction by both the Algerian administration and the French
administration that seemed to shape the way in which the conflict unfolded, was the role
that each gave to the military. When it became clear that the FLN was a very serious
threat to the French colonial power, and that the organization had the ability to perform
effective political and military actions, the French government ceded its political
authority to the military leadership in Algeria. This naturally undercut any possibility for
a political negotiation. The Battle of Algiers, where the paratroopers were given carteblanche, was another example of the atrocities that occurred when the military was given
unrestricted power. There was so much violence in that city that it became difficult to
differentiate between provocation terrorism and vengeance terrorism and although the
military was successful in removing the FLN from the city, its actions persuaded more
individuals to support the cause of Algerian liberation. The unobstructed power of the
military would once again come to haunt Algerian politics, when the military forced
President Bendjedid to resign in 1992, and set in place a system where military personnel
became leaders in the new government. With an indirect, yet increasing, control over the
government, the military adopted an ever more violent policy, which in turn led to a
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growing number of protests from citizens. Even at the end of the conflict, after the Law
of Civil Concord had been passed, the army launched major offensives against the
guerillas, doubling the number of deaths for the year. The leadership of free Algeria made
the same policy mistakes as its colonial precursor and its aggressive and brutal actions led
to an increase of support for the FIS, rather than showing the people that an Islamic
government would fail to provide the changes needed for national success.
There are also many examples which could be used to support the claim that the
FIS of the 1990s took many of its policies, strategies, and tactics from the FLN of the
1950s; this only adds further irony to the situation since the FLN administration of the
1990s claimed its legitimacy from its actions in the war against France and yet it believed
that the events planned by the FIS invalidated the Islamic party. Both groups relied
heavily on scare tactics and threats of terrorism to receive the support of the Algerian
citizens. The FLN would extort food and funds from the civilians and threaten them with
violence if they refused to cooperate and maintain their silence. The FIS destroyed
hundreds of schools across the country with fires and communes and villages were forced
to pay large fees to members of the Islamic militant groups of the FIS; those communities
which refused would suffer large scale massacres. Acts of terrorism by the insurgents
were also popular tactics during both wars and proved to be fairly effective tools of
provocation. The FLN would place bombs at popular meeting places or other locations
that would garner a great deal of attention from the French. Its hope was that the events
could provoke the French to react with an unequal, greater response, further angering and
instilling fear in the people of Algeria; numerous examples were previously discussed in
the prior chapter. The FLN administration was forced to deal with the same policy over
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thirty years later, when the FIS began to set off bombs in restaurants, post offices,
markets, cinemas, and other public places. The FIS once again fostered a sense of
hopelessness and terror amongst Algerians and the government was forced to react with
collective punishments, further angering the citizens and directing their support towards
the insurgency.
A Hypothetical, Peaceful Algeria
When one looks back on the history of Algeria, it can be noted that there are a
number of events, which having received a different outcome, would have completely
altered the North African country. One such event is the continuing stay of France in
Algeria, even after that first year of unrest. Many scholars view the decision of the
colonial power to remain in control as catastrophic for both nations. Although the truth
can never be fully know, it certainly can be argued that had France left Algeria in 1955,
before the Philippeville Massacre, the FLN would not have been as powerful and as
militant as it was and that the Civil War of the 1990s would have been avoided.
It is well-documented that there were a number of more moderate, political parties
who were supportive of a politically liberated Algeria but believed that freedom could
come in a form other than violence. These moderate groups did not initially support the
doctrine of the FLN and it was only after the massive, collective response by the French
for the Philippeville Massacre that the majority of the moderate parties joined forces with
the FLN. One organization which bucked the popular sentiment was the Mouvement
National Algérien, and as was previously discussed, this organization was filled with
political moderates who would get into a violent conflict with the FLN after the summer
of 1955. Had France left the country before August 1955, there would not have been the
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uprising by the FLN that summer or the response of the French military, which inevitably
provided the Algerian organization with more legitimacy from the politically moderate
faction. The FLN would not have grown in power and the MNA would not have become
an internal enemy of the insurgency. There would have been a moderate voice in the
post-colonial government that would have provided Algeria a counter to the more radical,
militant views of the FLN.
In addition to preserving a diversity of viewpoints, an early French departure
would have left the FLN with little legitimacy in a free nation. There was a large power
vacuum when French institutions left the nation, and with the purge of all moderate
voices, the FLN used its actions in the war to justify its takeover. This was an effective
strategy and the sentiment which emanated from the war carried the FLN for nearly thirty
years. The combination of stagnant policy results and a younger generation, who no
longer appreciated the war-time feeling, has been shown to have led to the questioning of
the FLN administration, a perfectly suited situation for the Islamist political ideology to
take root. With no war, there would not only be no platform for legitimacy of the FLN,
but there would be a more plural and diverse pool of voices from which the government
would have been formed.
In the end the wars that have torn Algeria apart can not simply be blamed on one
specific organization. There were many individuals who took part in the War for
Independence and the Civil War. It can be argued that had France left Algeria in 1955 the
two main issues that caused the Civil War, lack of legitimacy and moderate viewpoints,
would not have plagued the nation; France must certainly take responsibility for its direct
role in the 1950s conflict. It can also be claimed that the FLN of the 1950s provoked the
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French military and created an ideology in Algeria that the use of violence can be
justified in the goal of obtaining political success, a philosophy that was adopted by the
FIS forty years later. It can also be disputed that the Algerian administration of the 1990s
reacted in the same way that the French government did in the 1950s and that the FIS
operated with tactics similar to those of the FLN during its struggle for liberation. In the
end, Algeria has never been able to create its own history, having always been
monopolized by a single power. When finally given the chance to be a free nation, the
FLN and Algerian administration knew of no other way to govern than that of its
European predecessor while the FIS knew of no other way to express its discontent than
through a violent revolution like the FLN. After nearly fifty years of political liberation,
the Algerians have created a cyclical pattern where violence and political success have
become mutually exclusive and change must come at the cost of hundreds of thousands
of lives.
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